https://ausm.community Wed, 22 May 2024 17:15:34 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.0 https://ausm.community/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/cropped-12744099_1052201084822931_1672012108975694481_n-32x32.png https://ausm.community 32 32 October 15 – November 18, 2023: “Socialism 101: Resisting Racial & Colonial Capitalism in Latin America” https://ausm.community/3357-2/ https://ausm.community/3357-2/#respond Wed, 22 May 2024 17:09:40 +0000 https://ausm.community/?p=3357

October 16: Bennington College
October 17: SUNY Albany
October 18: SUNY New Paltz
October 20: Connecticut College
November 13: SUNY Binghamton
November 14: Goucher College
November 15: Morgan State University
November 16: Guilford College
November 17: Warren Wilson College

What if we dared to envision an economic system that puts people at its core?

Despite a crushing economic blockade, for over sixty years Cuba has built up a system that puts people over profit. What do they mean when they say they’re building socialism? And how has it played out in practice?

Join us for an introductory exploration of socialism, beginning with a critical examination of racial and colonial capitalism — how it functions, how it fails, and how it has shaped the neo-colonial relationships between the Global North and the Global South. We will then learn about the alternative form of political economy known as “socialism,” which takes as its primary objectives the well-being of people, rather than the accumulation of profit.

As a contemporary case study, we will explore some of the successes, achievements, and challenges of Cuban socialism, including a brief history of the 1959 Revolution and some of the structures which make up Cuban society today. From its world-renowned healthcare to its localized and environmentally sustainable agriculture, from its systems of democratic political engagement to its celebrated artistic and cultural landscape, Cuba presents a hopeful alternative to a profit-oriented capitalist economy. It is also a country that continues to pay dearly for daring to create another way of life. We will end with an overview of the challenges Cuba has faced along its journey, with a particular focus on the US economic blockade against Cuba, as well as an invitation to study abroad in Cuba with the Autonomous University of Social Movements to experience the Cuban context firsthand!

Sabrina Melendez (they/them) is a queer Puerto Rican activist, artist, and scholar, as well as an alumnus of the Autonomous University of Social Movement’s study abroad program in Cuba. They studied alternative political economies at Bennington College and the California Institute of Integral Studies, and co-founded a grassroots university for activists which has graduated over 600 students in the span of almost 5 years. Sabrina directed a summer camp for queer and trans youth for 4 years, has taught JEDI (Justice, Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) trainings for 3 years, and has participated in struggles toward migrant justice, abolition, labor solidarity, climate justice, animal liberation, feminism, and socialism for over a decade.

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The Fourth Transformation and the Future of Mexico https://ausm.community/the-4t/ https://ausm.community/the-4t/#respond Tue, 01 Feb 2022 19:34:49 +0000 https://ausm.community/?p=3083

The Fourth Transformation and the Future of Mexico

by the Autonomous University of Social Movements

February 1, 202

In July 2018, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) won Mexico’s Presidential election in a landslide.  Before the formal swearing-in ceremony on December 1, AMLO was already announcing bold, if not always clearly defined, initiatives built around “republican austerity” and “political love.” He never mentioned the word socialism, and as a matter of honesty, it’s probably a good thing. His “Left” proposals included conservative macroeconomic policies largely consistent with previous PAN and PRI administrations, safe spaces for his capitalist friends (and there are many), and lucrative roles for the military. Meanwhile, his public relations department worked overtime announcing modest populist programs to manage poverty at the margins without altering underlying power dynamics. He packaged his administration as the Fourth Transformation (4-T), with promises to reduce corruption, improve economic fairness, and provide safety and security. The 4-T became AMLO’s bombastic claim to historical significance, following the landmark events of Mexican independence in the early nineteenth century, liberal reform in the 1850s and 60s, and the national revolution in the early twentieth century. In the following pages, we will examine his populism, his sometimes contradictory commitment to austerity, his growing alliance with the military, and his continuation of neoliberal macroeconomic policies under a nationalist guise. Rather than transforming Mexico, AMLO is tidying up his predecessor’s mess, showing himself to be quite adept at managing capitalism for the capitalist class.

Clean Politics?

AMLO was the first presidential candidate since 1988 to win a majority of the vote, rather than the more typical election scenario in recent decades in which Presidents limped into office with a plurality, generally around 40%. His party, Morena, and its allies also took both houses of Congress, marking the first time a single party coalition controlled both executive and legislative branches since the PRI lost the presidency in 2000. AMLO is not known as an inspirational speaker. Rather, his carefully cultivated image as an honest politician of humble means provided the recipe for victory after a series of PRI and PAN administrations widely known for corruption and incompetence. 

He quickly took a series of highly publicized actions meant to demonstrate one of his central campaign promises – “There can be no rich government and a poor people.” He converted Los Pinos, the opulent presidential residence since 1934, into a cultural space open to the public. He tried to sell the presidential plane, a $200 million vanity purchase by his predecessor. When the sale entered its third year without a buyer, AMLO tried an auction, also unsuccessful. Currently, the plane sits in mothballs without a buyer in sight, while AMLO uses commercial flights. On the road, he usually drives an older Volkswagen Jetta. A renamed government agency, the Institute for Returning to the People What Was Stolen (really!), auctioned several million dollars of Lamborghinis, Corvettes, and other ostentatious vehicles used by previous administrations or seized from drug dealers. Lopez Obrador also took a 40 percent pay cut, reduced many high-level government salaries, canceled presidential pensions, and abolished the presidential guard, a 2,000-strong elite military force tasked with protecting high-level officials and international guests. In the context of a US$350 billion budget, we’re talking pennies, but the publicity helped cement a loyal following.

Shortly after assuming the presidency, AMLO canceled plans to build a new Mexico City airport, though the facility was already 20% completed and 60% under contract. In the face of polls showing strong support for the airport, AMLO organized a popular consulta to decide its future. With the outcome a foregone conclusion, consulta opponents mounted legal challenges, prompting Lopez Obrador to declare the airport a question of national security. A largely friendly Supreme Court supported this unorthodox move, undergirding a presidency characterized by strong-arming political opponents and little patience for dissent. Ultimately, only 1.2% of registered voters participated in the consulta, with polling stations set up mainly in Morena strongholds. The outcome (70% preferred cancelation) allowed the President to kill three birds with one stone: he canceled a project that he characterized during his campaign as rife with corruption and cost overruns, he marked a clear dividing line between his administration and the previous PRI presidency, and he moved the new airport to the Santa Lucia military base (the military would become a key player in the Morena administration). 

Morena Populism

AMLO is perhaps best known for his populism. While serving as Mayor of Mexico City from 2000-2005, he previewed what would become a centerpiece of his presidential campaign by providing small monthly payments to seniors. As President, he expanded social programs with direct payments to seniors, students, and the infirm. While families living in poverty appreciated the help, the manner of delivery replicated the same corporativism (aka clientelism) that kept the PRI in power for 70 years. 

The PRI organized urban labor, campesinos, and communities into hierarchical structures that filtered government funds through party-affiliated (though superficially independent) organizations at the national, state, and local levels. Most officials took a cut, leaving little by the time it reached the base, but the system proved efficient for winning elections and controlling social unrest. Before elections, officials often collected voting cards in exchange for fertilizer, seeds, direct payments, etc., with the tacit understanding that future aid depended on compliance. When the PAN and Vicente Fox took charge in 2000, the PRI’s corporativist structures found themselves with dramatically reduced funding and less political influence. The PAN had a new idea – send conditional cash transfers through government programs Oportunidades, Prospera or Progesa (depending on the sexenio – each President likes to brand his own programs). Recipients were expected to meet certain health and education standards, including mandatory school attendance for children and regular health and nutrition checkups. Payments were generally made to the female head of households. This largely did away with the corporativist middlemen (though government bureaucrats still had their fingers in the till) and began to establish a direct link between PAN-initiated welfare programs (however underfunded) and individual citizens. This also left citizens without the organizational links to government, even if weak and tentative, that the corporativist system had provided.

AMLO’s direct payments took on a new twist, borrowing from both the PRI and PAN. Shortly after taking office, AMLO launched Servidores de la Nacion (Servants of the Nation). Some 18,000 government functionaries – previous Morena campaign staff now employed by the Secretaria de Bienestar (Secretary of Well-being) – spread out across the country to deliver cash payments directly to the front doors of citizens. Servidores present themselves as representatives of the President, a new take on the PAN’s individualization of government assistance. Initially, they wore badges emblazoned with the President’s name. A ruling by the National Electoral Commission forced them to cover the badges with masking tape, though AMLO is still hiding underneath. The basic structure replicates Morena’s presidential campaign (and the PRI’s corporativist structures). It utilizes the same people: 18,299 base employees with monthly salaries of 10,217 pesos, 266 regional coordinators with salaries of 73,207 pesos, and 32 state Delegates with salaries of 100,000 pesos. Servidores deliver cash or pre-paid cards directly to millions of recipients, including 8 million seniors, a million unemployed youth, and a million students and farmers.

Anxious to burnish his environmental credentials, AMLO initiated the US$1.4 billion Planting Life program, which aims to plant and tend a billion trees, mostly commercial hardwoods, and fruit trees, and eventually employ 1.2 million mainly rural workers. AMLO wants to extend the program to Central America, with financing from the US, as a way to stem undocumented immigration from the South. But the program has come under criticism for replacing diverse native forests with a commercially viable monoculture that will soon be harvested by loggers. Some farmers reportedly fell large swaths of native woodlands only to replace them with newly planted trees to qualify for a monthly stipend of US$12.

While millions of poor, and some middle-class, citizens receive direct payments, social projects like daycare are defunded. For decades, the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) operated daycare centers for working families employed in the formal sector and registered with IMSS, but spaces were limited. Applicants often waited years for placement. In 2007, President Felipe Calderon began subsidizing private daycare facilities, part of the PAN’s efforts to privatize social services. The poorly regulated industry was rife with corruption. In the most notorious case, a fire killed 49 children in 2009 at a licensed private center in Hermosillo owned by relatives of First Lady Margarita Zavala. AMLO ended subsidy payments to private facilities in February 2019, citing a government census that identified 50,000 “phantom” children out of a sample of 210,000 formal enrollments. He replaced subsidies with direct payments to parents of US$40 per month distributed by Servidores and suggested that grandmothers be paid for child care. Rather than expanding the state system, which was generally recognized as providing quality daycare, or regulating the private system, AMLO converted daycare into yet another political program to secure votes. Meanwhile, quality and affordable daycare is harder to find, and not every family can count on a grandmother to watch the kids.

Historically Mexico had a confusing array of healthcare programs that often combined public and private options. Workers with strong unions, like the electrical, train, and oil industries, had their own hospitals and insurance programs. A third of the workforce employed “officially,” in other words, taxpaying members of the formal economy, were covered by government health insurance. The Instituto Mexicano de Seguro Social (IMSS) operated at both state and federal levels. Government employees, including teachers, had their own health care system, the Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores (ISSSTE). The majority of the population didn’t have “official” jobs, meaning they had no access to State-sponsored health care, in fact, no health coverage at all if they couldn’t afford private insurance. In 2003, the PAN initiated Seguro Popular, a program that offered limited coverage for the uninsured. Seguro Popular utilized an unwieldy combination of State-funded medical centers and government payments to private hospitals, resulting in widespread corruption without achieving universal coverage. By 2018, there were still some 20 million Mexicans, almost a fifth of the population, without coverage. Seguro Popular was characterized at the time as a neoliberal reform that attempted to privatize health care while maintaining limited government funding.

In December 2018, AMLO ended Seguro Popular, eventually introducing the newly formed Instituto de Salud para el Bienestar (INSABI) on January 1, 2020, with a mandate to provide publicly funded health care for 70 million Mexicans in the informal sector. With an initial budget of 152.5 billion pesos (US$7.6 billion), INSABI is responsible for contracting existing and new health care workers under federal labor agreements, bulk purchases of pharmaceuticals, maintenance of existing health care facilities, and construction of new facilities, particularly in underserved rural areas. One estimate called for a budget five times larger to accomplish INSABI’s goals. By comparison, the US spent US$776 billion on Medicare in 2020 for about 63 million enrollees. Admittedly this is a very rough comparison given significant differences in medical costs between the two countries, extensive use of private medical facilities by Medicare, and the advanced age of many Medicare patients. Nevertheless, Medicare spends about 100 times what INSABI budgets to cover approximately the same number of patients, indicating the challenges faced by INSABI or, perhaps more accurately, the quality of care envisioned by the program.

INSABI represents a radical departure from Seguro Popular. Reconstructing an entire national health care system is a huge undertaking, and it’s too soon to tell if AMLO’s best intentions will be realized. Frequent shortages of some pharmaceuticals, particularly cancer meds for children, have been widely reported in the media. Given the scope of change, some hiccups are to be expected. More concerning is the lack of a clear plan for oversight and evaluation. Lopez Obrador expects his populist credentials to justify any action, even in the face of a country with a long history of government corruption and ineptitude. Unfortunately, his administration is populated with political operators from previous administrations, including many former officials from the PRI and PAN. 

If AMLO’s reaction to the COVID pandemic is indicative of his attitudes toward medical care, Mexicans have good reason to be concerned. He repeatedly downplayed the pandemic, scoffed at the use of masks, characterized COVID testing as a waste of time and resources, discouraged sick Mexicans from quarantining, and refused to practice social distancing. In January 2022, he was diagnosed for the second time with COVID. Meanwhile, Mexico has one of the highest death rates globally, and hospitals have repeatedly been overwhelmed with COVID cases.

Economic Development

In the decade before AMLO’s presidency, Mexican economic growth averaged just over 2% yearly – certainly nothing to brag about. In 2019 the economy shrank by 0.2%, then plummeted in 2020 by an additional 8.3%, marking the worst decline in at least 60 years. This can hardly be laid at AMLO’s feet. The worldwide COVID crisis combined with Mexico’s declining oil production and prices in 2019 left the country in the midst of a deep recession. The official unemployment rate hovers around 4%, but that number is essentially meaningless. Mexico does not have national unemployment insurance, so to be unemployed often means to starve. Hence, almost everyone finds a way to hustle a few pesos, even if it means washing car windows at busy corners, selling everything from throat lozenges to self-help books on the subway, or begging. Mexico’s major cities, and many mid-sized population centers, are literally filled with millions of people inventing ways to eat every day. In this context, AMLO’s direct payments to the poorest populations are essential for survival.

Given AMLO’s oft-repeated mantra “primero los pobres” (first the poor), his welfare programs are timely and understandable, while also under-funded and politically inspired band-aids covering serious structural problems. Meanwhile, his development policies leave no room for such guarded optimism. AMLO’s three pet mega-projects take center stage: the Maya tourist train in the Yucatan peninsula, the Dos Bocas oil refinery in his home state of Tabasco, and the aforementioned Santa Lucía airport outside Mexico City.

The Maya tourist train is budgeted at US$10 billion, but cost overruns are inevitable. AMLO justified the investment with a regional consulta in December 2019, in which 2.4% of eligible voters participated, almost all Morena supporters. Predictably, it was approved by 92% or slightly more than 2% of the directly affected population. In the face of dozens of lawsuits that threatened to halt construction, Lopez Obrador declared the project a “national security” issue in November 2021, thereby sidestepping environmental regulations and civil suits. Upon completion, the armed forces will own the train, with profits going to military pensions. The train is the central piece in a development project for the Southeast that includes natural resource extraction, maquiladoras, tourism, and much more. It is widely recognized as an environmental and social disaster that will displace indigenous communities from their ancestral lands and destroy millions of acres of tropical rainforest. The Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) and the National Indigenous Council (CNI) are among dozens of indigenous, environmental, and civic groups opposing the project.

As for the Dos Bocas refinery, AMLO reversed at least three decades of neoliberal energy policies that featured privatization of petroleum and electricity. These policies were not generally popular in Mexico, especially the reforms of 2013-2014 granting foreign oil companies access to Mexico. Under a nationalist and anti-neoliberal banner that combines energy sovereignty and security, AMLO strengthened the two major State energy companies – Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) and the Federal Electricity Company (CFE). In 2019, Pemex was the most heavily indebted oil company globally, thanks to a combination of corruption and efforts by previous administrations to weaken the company in favor of private energy companies. In 2020, Mexico exported US$17.4 billion in crude oil while importing US$31.4 billion in mainly processed petroleum products, including gasoline and natural gas (although Mexico has the fifth-largest natural gas reserves in the world). Lopez Obrador wants to make Mexico a producer of finished, high-value-added petroleum products rather than an exporter of raw materials. He faces three major challenges. 

First, refinery capacity in Mexico is insufficient and has been decreasing in recent years. The US$8 billion Dos Bocas petroleum refinery is intended to reverse this trend. Financed in part by a US$600 million Chinese loan, it will be the largest facility of its kind in Mexico, capable of processing 340,000 barrels per day when completed in 2022 – assuming no delays. Pemex will own and manage the facility. AMLO’s national energy plan contemplates updating six existing Pemex facilities, costing between US$500 million and US$3.5 billion each, for a total capacity of 1.7 million barrels per day. In addition, Pemex purchased the Deer Park refinery from Shell in Houston, Texas. Pemex was previously a 50% partner in the facility. These are ambitious goals, given AMLO’s austerity government without plans to raise new taxes, and it’s not clear if or when financing might be available.

Second, Pemex and the CFE are notoriously corrupt. Pemex’s long and ignoble history includes the Pemexgate scandal in which the PRI transferred US$53 million to its 2000 presidential candidate. Pemex employees and union bosses have been implicated in repeated financial chicanery, everything from misuse of company funds to stealing petroleum from pipelines. The recent case of former Pemex chief executive Emilio Lozoya is exemplary, though hardly unique. Lozoya was extradited from Spain to Mexico in July 2020 on charges of bribery, money laundering, and racketeering. Upon his return to Mexico, Lozoya leveled bombshell accusations claiming former Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto, his former treasury minister, two other former presidents, five former senators, and two former presidential candidates orchestrated an extensive corruption scheme, including bribery that facilitated passage of the controversial 2013-2014 energy reform. At first glance, a serious prosecution of Lozoya could place AMLO in the driver’s seat in terms of cleaning up corruption at Pemex. The problem is that many members of AMLO’s administration were members of past administrations and are likely to be implicated in any thorough investigation. 

The CFE has also seen its share of corruption. Manuel Bartlett, a prominent member of the PRI before joining AMLO’s administration as head of CFE, was investigated in 2019 for accumulating a US$41 million real estate portfolio, impossible on a bureaucrat’s salary. Lopez Obrador publicly expressed support for his embattled employee. AMLO himself is a former member of the PRI and PRD. Long accustomed to the moneyed realpolitik of Mexico, he may see Pemex and the CFE as political cash cows – Pemex alone provides 17.5% of Mexico’s federal revenue. AMLO also covets support from their huge unionized workforces. Only time will tell, but if the snail’s pace prosecution of Lozoya is any indication, AMLO may prefer to manage government corruption for his own political needs rather than reforming the energy behemoths.

Third, in a world threatened by global warming, massive investments in petroleum would appear unwise. In 2020, Mexico had proven petroleum reserves of 8 billion barrels. Given current petroleum consumption, proven reserves could be exhausted in about ten years (though this presupposes no new exploration). Whether petroleum is available or not, many environmentalists would prefer it remains in the ground. After resigning as head of the Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources in 2020, biologist Víctor Manuel Toledo expressed his dismay with the lack of concern for environmental protection. His ministry’s 2020 budget amounted to only 2.5% of the “fossil fuels budget” designated for Pemex, CFE, and the Secretariat of Energy. Toledo is hardly a stellar example of environmentalism – among other things, he was a proponent of the Train Maya. If even someone with Toledo’s political tendencies resigns in protest, AMLO’s environmental policies must be disastrous.

Unfortunately, one of the few “development” options available for most working-class Mexicans is high-risk employment in the narco-political economy. With better pay than government-sponsored development programs, illegal drugs are a lucrative, if dangerous, business that in many ways epitomizes the neoliberal dream of free markets, as well as the neoliberal reality that threatens broad sectors across the Mexican social spectrum. In fact, narco-gangs already occupy important positions in Mexico’s capitalist economy, providing the muscle to control workers on mega-projects, forcing campesinos to abandon strategic properties, and often colluding with the army and police. Narco-dollars are invested in any number of “legitimate” enterprises. Cartels exercise virtual sovereignty in large parts of Mexico, often in concert with the political class, including Morena.

AMLO’s Neoliberalism

Lopez Obrador was a constant critic of neoliberal economic policies, yet most of his program of “republican austerity” is completely consistent with neoliberalism. His commitment to the business community was apparent in the renegotiation of NAFTA, rebranded in 2018 as the USMCA. After tripartite negotiations with the US and Canada, which began in 2017, the text was signed by all three heads of State on November 30, 2018, the day before AMLO’s swearing-in ceremony. AMLO did not participate directly in negotiations, but given his position as President-elect, with outgoing President Enrique Pena Nieto widely unpopular, it’s hard to imagine a scenario in which he didn’t give tacit approval. AMLO publicly and repeatedly criticized the agreement, and he could have torpedoed it by preventing passage of enabling legislation in a Congress controlled by Morena. But he didn’t. AMLO kept his friends in the business community happy while simultaneously maintaining a public populist stance opposed to the USMCA.

NAFTA set the stage for regional neoliberal free trade treaties, and there is little difference between NAFTA and the USMCA aside from the name. The renegotiation was at the behest of Donald Trump, who, more than anything, wanted to distance himself from virtually every political position taken by previous presidents. The renaming achieved that goal at the level of media perception, always the most important level for Trump. Like NAFTA, the USMCA institutionalized the free flow of goods and money across borders while strictly controlling the movement of people. It commits signatories to abide by IMF exchange rate standards and prevents subsidies for state-owned enterprises (it’s not clear how Mexico will square this with increased subsidies to Pemex), both central elements in the neoliberal bible that limits the role of the State in economic affairs. It contains language making it virtually impossible for either Canada or Mexico to sign trade agreements with China, further hitching Mexico’s economic development to US neoliberal capitalism. And it extends some elements of the tripartite open market within North America.

During the daily “mañanera” (in colloquial Spanish, a morning “quickie,” but in AMLO’s lexicon, a daily early morning press conference), Lopez Obrador often berates big business and political elites for fueling corruption and poverty. But behind the scenes, he maintains strong relations with Mexico’s most powerful business elites. Early in his Presidency, Lopez Obrador formed a business advisory council coordinated by Alfonso Romo, at the time the President’s chief of staff (an unpaid volunteer position with no political precedent in Mexico). In his private life, Romo is a billionaire agro-industrialist and owner of the largest fund management company in Latin America. Aligned with the PRI during the Salinas administration (when he accumulated much of his fortune), later with Vicente Fox and the PAN (roughly Mexico’s version of the Republican Party), Romo switched alliances in 2012 and signed up with team AMLO. The council included: Ricardo Salinas Pliego of Grupo Salinas, a conglomerate that includes Banco Azteca, TV Azteca and Elektra; Bernardo Gómez of Televisa; Olegario Vázquez Aldir of Grupo Empresarial Ángeles, a conglomerate that includes Imagen TV, the newspaper Excélsior and Hospitales Ángeles; Carlos Hank González of Grupo Financiero Banorte, tortilla multinational Gruma and Grupo Hermes; Daniel Chávez of Grupo Vidanta, a hotel and resort conglomerate; Miguel Rincón of paper company Bio-Pappel; Sergio Gutiérrez of metal supply company DeAcero; and Miguel Alemán Magnani of Interjet. Note the preponderance of media giants in this list. Televisa is the largest TV station in Mexico, followed by TV Azteca, and Excelsior is a leading national newspaper. AMLO’s efforts to construct a populist image are dependent on favorable media coverage. 

Carlos Slim, Mexico’s wealthiest businessman and owner of Grupo Carso, was noticeably absent from the list, though AMLO has a long friendship with the mogul and has met with him privately on numerous occasions. Grupo Carso built much of the elevated train in southern Mexico City that collapsed suddenly last year, killing 26 people, perhaps accounting for some public distancing. Slim and Carlos Salazar, head of the Business Coordinating Council (CCE), Mexico’s leading business association, have influenced key government policies behind the scenes on several occasions. They reversed a threat by AMLO to cancel US$12 billion in pipeline construction contracts signed by a combination of foreign companies and Slim’s Grupo Carso. They were instrumental in negotiating an agreement with President Trump to curb a surge in immigration from Central America by using the Mexican military (turning Mexico into the enforcement arm of US immigration policy calls into question AMLO’s nationalist credentials). AMLO even agreed to modify his public discourse by avoiding the use of the word “fifi,” a pejorative term for privileged elites. 

Despite his claim as a leftist, Lopez Obrador is often described as a “pragmatist” – read pro-capitalist. He defends his relationships with business elites as necessary for the 4% annual economic growth that he predicts. His “pragmatism” was on display in 2020 when he made his first international trip to Washington, DC, in what can only be described as a campaign stop for Donald Trump. As Politico writes, the two heads of State “built a relationship based on their respect for each other’s nationalist, authoritarian tendencies and their ability to stay out of each other’s way on domestic issues.” 

Military Allies

Demilitarization and crime reduction were among AMLO’s central campaign promises. But after three years in office, the military is involved in policing, government management, and the economy in unprecedented ways, while homicide rates are essentially stagnant, with 36,661 murders in 2019 and 36,579 in 2020. Mexico owns one of the highest murder rates in the world at 29 per 100,000 population. According to data from the president’s office, October 2020 saw 214,735 armed forces members carry out public security tasks. 2022 began auspiciously with the murder of two journalists, most likely victims of drug cartels or local officials allied with the cartels. Forty-eight reporters have been slain since December 2018. While most of these cases go unsolved, in cases where suspects are identified, almost half are local officials. Apart from war zones, Mexico is considered one of the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists. The cartels have become so powerful that they’ve literally taken control of some local and regional governments. 

In one of his first major acts as President, AMLO launched the Mexican National Guard. The 90,000-strong force is composed mainly of soldiers from the army and navy, with about a quarter coming from the former Federal Police. While formally under civilian control, operational control of the National Guard is in the hands of Luis Rodríguez Bucio, a retired army general, and all of the Guard’s commanders are former members of the armed forces. Most of the Guard’s funding and equipment comes from the armed forces, and all recruitment centers are located on army bases. The National Guard is involved in a wide range of law enforcement activities: immigration enforcement, guarding oil pipelines, investigating common crimes, patrolling the Mexico City metro, and much more. The Guard expands on the military’s already extensive role in fighting (or, more correctly, making alliances with) organized crime and drug cartels. The Guard manages its internal justice system that is not answerable to civilian courts. AMLO’s creation of the National Guard adds to an already aggressive militarization of Mexican society. In addition to public safety and law enforcement, the military controls customs offices at ports, airports, and land crossings; construction of 2700 branch offices of the new Banco de Bienestar, responsible for distributing welfare payments; reforestation programs like Sowing Life; medication and vaccine distribution throughout the country; and textbook distribution across the country, plus 22 military high schools. These are lucrative enterprises, and the military is exempt from civilian judicial oversight.

Mexico’s military has a long and shameful history of corruption and human rights abuses. The case of General Salvador Cienfuegos, head of Mexico’s Ministry of Defense (SEDENA) from 2012-2018, is exemplary. Cienfuegos was critical of AMLO during his presidential campaign, yet when he was arrested on October 15, 2020, at the Los Angeles airport, accused of being a drug cartel boss, AMLO negotiated his release, and charges were dropped. During his time as head of SEDENA, the army was implicated in 3,311 human rights cases presented by the National Human Rights Commission, including the disappearance and presumed murder of 43 students in Ayotzinapa. 

During his campaign, Lopez Obrador committed to the gradual return of the military to its barracks, drug legalization, transitional justice, and selective amnesties.  He insisted that his policies to combat government corruption and economic inequality would lead to a decrease in crime rates, but since assuming the Presidency, his “abrazos no balazos” (hugs not bullets) means, essentially, the past is past and impunity reigns. Drug cartels continue to exercise virtual sovereignty over large parts of Mexico, while the military and police protect them in exchange for payoffs (see the works of journalists Anabel Hernandez and Jose Reveles for detailed reporting on the links between government officials and narco cartels). 

AMLO refers to the military as “the people in uniform.” Maybe he hopes his growing partnership with the military will spawn an efficient organization dedicated to a nationalist project, similar to the Cuban or Venezuelan military. Of course, there are many differences. AMLO has no intention of building socialism, and Mexico’s military, a historically corrupt mess, has little in common with either Cuba or Venezuela. More likely, AMLO is building this relationship, along with his many close working friendships with some of the country’s leading capitalists and media giants, in recognition of Mexico’s existing realpolitik. Behind “abrazos no balazos” and his highly public, though selective, commitment to austerity is a quest for power. Don’t be surprised if AMLO overcomes the constitutional prescription to a one-term presidency or, more likely, rules from the shadows after 2024 by mobilizing his links to the military and the capitalist class.

Where is AMLO Headed?

Mexico’s history is littered with powerful presidential figures. Until the 2000 elections, they chose their own successors in the infamous dedazo (the big finger that figuratively points out the next president). AMLO appears to be moving Mexico back into this PRI-initiated political practice. Everything points to AMLO accumulating power at a personal level which, one supposes, will translate into votes for whatever Morena candidate he chooses in 2024 while he manages from backstage. Lopez Obrador claims leftist credentials, though it’s hard to see on what basis. Karl Marx described his current policies with uncanny precision in the Communist Manifesto. He criticized “reforms … that in no respect affect the relations between capital and labor, but, at best, lessen the cost and simplify the administrative work of bourgeois government.”

Perhaps AMLO’s most lasting legacy will be the weakening, some say dismantling, of Left forces in Mexico. AMLO’s clarion call to poor and working-class Mexicans is backed by real pesos, even if in barely livable quantities. The cost to the federal government is modest, but the social peace it buys in a country slammed by COVID and inequality is invaluable to business elites who are banking on Morena to maintain social stability. 

In recent years the Left had a dispersed and inconsistent presence in politics as well as communities. The notable exception is the Zapatistas, whose criticism of Lopez Obrador dates to his days as Mayor of Mexico City and later during his first two presidential runs in 2006 and 2012. AMLO publicly courted the Zapatista throughout his political career, but the Zapatistas have been firm in their rejection, characterizing him as “nothing more than the moderate right.” Their critiques of AMLO cost them some popular support 17 years ago, but now that he’s in power, AMLO has proven the Zapatistas correct. As in the past, his public pronouncements regarding the Zapatistas are generally cordial or non-confrontational, but his actions speak louder than his words. In three years of his administration, Zapatista communities have suffered a series of attacks and murders by paramilitary groups affiliated with Morena or allied parties in Chiapas (see enlacezapatista for extensive reports). Rather than address the violence, Lopez Obrador dismisses it as “indigenous inter-community disputes,” a common racist trope in Mexico’s elite circles, and washes his hands (we will write more about AMLO and the Zapatistas in next month’s news).

After three years in power, AMLO’s shortcomings are now clear. He consorts with the same elites and governs through the same clientelist structures as always. Apart from token redistribution programs, his greatest novelty is expanding the military’s reach across broad sectors of society. Again, the Zapatistas boldly proclaimed his tendencies 17 years ago. Unfortunately, those who dismissed them as “electoral spoilers” in 2006 are not issuing retractions. In fact, some have jumped aboard the AMLO bandwagon, leaving parts of Mexico’s liberal Left disoriented and isolated. The “electoral left” is in fact, the moderate right. While the right is adept at fueling xenophobia, it also stokes powerful social movements and tends to leave state institutions in disarray. This is when the liberal hand of capital steps in, reducing tensions by redistributing a bit more money, charming liberals into accepting extractive megaprojects under the slogan of development, shoring up repressive forces and generally operating in the long term interests of profit accumulation. AMLO has shown himself to be quite skilled at managing capitalism for the capitalists.

 

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History Repeats https://ausm.community/cuba-history-repeats/ https://ausm.community/cuba-history-repeats/#respond Sat, 24 Jul 2021 14:58:19 +0000 https://ausm.community/?p=2911

History repeats

In 1989, the Soviet Union and its eastern bloc fell apart, literally overnight.  The impact in Cuba was immediate and dramatic.  Within 6 months, Cuba lost more than 70% of its international trade.  Over the next five years, the island’s economy shrank by half. (In comparison, at the height of the Great Depression from 1929 to 1933, the US economy shrank by 30%.)  The “special period in times of peace” took a toll across the island.  Food and fuel shortages, electrical blackouts, lack of medicines – every aspect of Cuban life was affected.  One might expect a humanitarian crisis of these proportions would engender sympathy among neighbors.  But instead of sending food and medicine, Republican President George HW Bush and Democratic President Bill Clinton cynically pounced on an “opportunity” to undermine a stable socialist government.  They worked across party lines to strengthen the US embargo, more accurately called a blockade, and isolate a struggling island from international economic ties.  The Cuban people rallied in the face of this historically unparalleled pressure, and the Cuban revolution survived.

Fast forward three decades and the world finds itself in a pandemic.  Two hundred million people sickened and four million dead.  Economic devastation across the globe.  And again, Democrats and Republicans see “opportunity” in Cuba – “Let’s beat them while they’re down!”  President Trump initiated 243 measures strengthening the embargo of Cuba and further isolating our neighbor (here for a comprehensive description of the embargo’s impact).  President Biden followed Trump’s example.  Cuba is left with a crippled economy, food and fuel shortages, and, perhaps most significant in the midst of a worldwide health crisis, shortages of medicines. 

Allied with Miami’s Cuban-American mafia and its proliferating NGGOs (non-governmental governmental organizations), social media is playing a new role largely unknown in the early 90s.  One particularly public group stands out.  Cuba Decide (spelled the same in English and Spanish) is front and center.  Their easily recognizable blue and white graphics were present at several demonstrations across the island on July 11. 

But before we buy into the rhetoric of mass anti-government mobilizations that dominate the mainstream media, let’s take a closer look at the reality on the ground.  Shortages of food and medicine mean long lines at stores, with many customers frustrated by the lack of supplies.  Fuel shortages result in irregular blackouts and undependable public transportation.  For Cubans accustomed to subsidized food, inexpensive public transport, and world-class medical care, shortages caused largely by the internationalized US embargo take a grave toll.  The embargo restricts trade with nearly every country in the world, yet some western media outlets and the US political class blame an inefficient Cuban government bureaucracy for poor economic performance.  The impact of the embargo was estimated at US$5 billion last year, a substantial loss for a small island nation with a total gross national product of about US$90 billion.  Whatever “inefficiencies” might exist, the embargo far outweighs their impact.  This is the same government that oversaw some of the best economic performance in Latin America during the 2000-2010 decade when GNP doubled – and this in spite of the embargo.  Today, Biden’s Cuba “opportunity” is defined by a tightened embargo and a worldwide COVID pandemic that decreased tourist earnings by at least 75% in 2020.  “Beat them when they’re down” takes on a whole new meaning.  Cuba joins a long list of countries with shrinking economies, medical emergencies, and increased difficulties.  Of course, Cubans are upset.  So is everyone else.

In the face of clear facts, some mainstream western media and non-government groups, like Cuba Decide, manufacture “reality.”  Most of the US-based media on Cuba is centered in Miami where right-wing Cuban Americans dominate the political and informational landscape.  If the Associated Press, the New York Times, or television networks are interested in Cuba, their sources are inevitably Miami-based reporters, complete with the Miami Mafia slant. On Sunday, July 11, reports began to surface of street demonstrations in about ten places across the island, ranging from small towns, with a few dozen protestors, to a few large cities where marches numbered up to perhaps a thousand.  In a country of 11 million people, a total of several thousand protesters took to the streets demanding more food and medical supplies.  A few dozen arrests were reported and there were no reports of deaths or serious injuries.  By Monday, with the Miami mafia in full propaganda mode, demands changed from food and medicine to “liberty,” and the Sunday numbers were suddenly in the hundreds of thousands.  By Tuesday, with Cuban-American politicians and NGGOs in Miami dominating talk shows and analysis, the numbers were suddenly in the millions.  Rosa María Payá, CEO of Cuba Decide, claimed five protestors were assassinated in Santiago de Cuba, citing “social media” as her source – the same social media her organization funds.  Payá claimed demonstrators organized around chants of “freedom” and “down with dictatorship,” demands consistent with the Cuba Decide political agenda to provoke social unrest.  Payá’s media presence created an image that generates future donations for her work and improves her standing with figures like Florida Sen. Marco Rubio, with whom she met the previous week, but is a far cry from objective truth.

Cuba Decide is not alone.  Accion Libertaria Nacional, funded from abroad but based on the island, says, “the idea is to create a climate of total insecurity and absolute ingovernability.”  Some of the foreign funding supports artists who distribute their work on the island.  Gente de Zona, a Miami-based musical group, wrote Patria y Vida (Homeland and Life), a vulgar takeoff on the popular revolutionary chant Patria o Muerte (Homeland or Death).  The Miami Mafia, organized under the SOSCuba banner, is demanding direct US military intervention.  Meanwhile, the technologically challenged President Biden called for US experts to install more internet connections in Cuba, rather than offering food and medicine. 

In 2020, the National Endowment for Democracy, a US taxpayer-sponsored slush fund, with money doled out directly by the Republican and Democratic Parties, distributed more than US$5 million to 30 organizations fomenting public unrest in Cuba.  And this is only the tip of the iceberg.  USAID funds for Cuban organizations often exceed US$6 million a year.  Private money from right-wing Cuban-Americans in Miami supplements government money.  The Jorge Mas Canosa Freedom Foundation has nearly US$12 million in assets, while the Cuban American National Foundation spends more than $1 million per year.  Much of the money destined for counter-revolutionary activities in Cuba doesn’t even pass through formal foundation accounting.  Well-armed paramilitary groups like Alpha 66 organize in the US, in open violation of the 80-year-old US Neutrality Act but without fear of prosecution by a sympathetic US government. 

Dark money funding violent street activities plays a central role in strategies to destabilize the island.  Payments are offered via social media for videos of certain actions – $1000 for an attack on a police patrol car, $2000 for the destruction of a police van, and $5000 for an attack on a government-operated dollar store.  Payments for videos of people throwing rocks during demonstrations are made via deposits on telephone cards.  This helps explain recent street violence, which is rare on the island, including the destruction of an official vehicle, and attacks on dollar stores and cars in Matanzas.  Just as the internet plays an outsized role in the US spreading lies about COVID vaccines or Trump’s election “victory”, social media is a potent tool in the hands of the Miami mafia for distributing disinformation and fomenting unrest.

Reports from Latin America, where news sources and political perspectives on Cuba are more diverse, painted a different picture.  Small anti-government protests stood in stark contrast to much larger demonstrations in cities across the island supporting the Cuban revolution.  The vast majority of Cubans denounce the protests and support the government, while also expressing concerns about the lack of food and medicine.  No one wants to live with severe shortages.  About one-fifth of Cubans over 16 are members of the Communist Party of Cuba or the youth branch of the party, and this is generally the most organized and politicized sector of the population.  This sector organized pro-government marches and confronted many of the anti-government protests in the streets (see this article for a description of the protests from a constructively critical viewpoint offered by Cuba’s Trotskyist left).

Reporting by La Jornada, one of Mexico’s most important national newspapers said, “President Miguel Díaz-Canel attended the protest held in the town of San Antonio de los Baños to listen to the demands of the population and explain the reasons for the hardships afflicting the country.”  This may have been an effort to replay the actions of then-President Fidel Castro, a revolutionary hero with historic moral authority, when he appeared at what became known as the Maleconazo, a demonstration of several hundred anti-government protestors on August 5, 1994, at the height of the “Special Period.”  The simple presence of Fidel quickly calmed the crowd. This time, President Diaz-Canel, representing the authority of the Communist Party and its millions of members, acknowledged that not all the demonstrators are “counterrevolutionaries, far from it”, but rather “dissatisfied” people.  He also denounced the destabilization campaign orchestrated by the Cuban-American mafia, and said “those who encourage these demonstrations do not want the welfare of the people, but the privatization of health and education, neoliberalism.”  Diaz-Canel asked for patience as Cuba tries to vaccinate 11 million citizens while also dealing with shortages and economic dislocation resulting from the US embargo.  “We’ve seen how the campaign against Cuba was growing on social media in the past few weeks,” said Diaz-Canel on Monday in a nationally televised appearance with his entire cabinet.  “That’s the way it’s done.  Try to create inconformity, dissatisfaction by manipulating emotions and feelings.”

Diaz-Canel spent a good deal of time post-July 11 patiently explaining the economic challenges Cuba faces, and distinguishing between counter-revolutionaries, often paid for their violent activities and stirred by the Miami mafia, and citizens frustrated by shortages.  The worldwide pandemic virtually destroyed Cuba’s international tourism, Cuba’s most important source of hard currency.  For a country that imports 70% of its food, this was devastating.  Meanwhile, Trump-era regulations, maintained by the Biden administration, severely limit family remittances.  In any case, dollars are almost useless for importing critical goods because embargo regulations leave the island without access to the US-controlled SWIFT system for international wire transfers, and therefore unable to use dollars for trade. 

Yet, in this context, Cuba’s successes are quite amazing.  Currently, in the midst of a surge, COVID cases reached 6,923 on July 11, more than twice the number registered earlier in the week, while deaths reached 47, according to the Johns Hopkins University Coronavirus Resource Center.  These kinds of numbers would represent a welcome respite in many parts of the US and around the world as the pandemic peaks in different places at different moments.  (Florida, with a population twice the size of Cuba, saw  24,017 new cases on July 20.  Arkansas, with about ¼ the population of Cuba, saw 2,552 new cases on July 19, and deaths often exceeded 60 per day during the last peak in January.)  Cuba is one of only a handful of countries to develop effective COVID vaccines.  As of mid-July, more than one-quarter of the population received at least one dose of a vaccine, which is 92% effective after three doses.  Cuba’s health authorities aim to have 70% of the island’s inhabitants vaccinated by September, and 100% by the end of the year, an amazing accomplishment for a small and relatively poor country suffering the impacts of a 60 year US embargo.  

In the medium term, there is real hope for the Cuban people.  A fully vaccinated population would allow reopening the tourist sector, with new income for food and medicine.  The syringes for Cuba campaign aims to provide 6 million of the 30 million syringes required for full vaccination.  (The reader may wonder how this is possible?  A complicated and time-consuming licensing process is available for some medical supplies.  Businesses are inevitably unwilling to submit to this bureaucratic roadblock – talk about inefficiencies! – while committed solidarity activists are not deterred.)  Progressive Cuban-Americans in Miami began a series of monthly caravans in March to protest the embargo.  This quickly grew to encompass forty cities on the third or fourth Sunday of every month.  Pastors for Peace is planning its 30th Friendshipment caravan to Cuba in November.  And a series of actions around the US are planned for July 24-26 by the ANSWER Coalition.

Whatever progress Cuba is able to generate, the embargo is always lurking in the background, taking its pound of flesh from every Cuban.  US citizens elected Joseph Biden and we have a responsibility to force him to abide by his campaign promise to end the embargo.  Cubans have suffered enough.  Now is the time for change!

 

Author: Autonomous University of Social Movements (AUSM)

 

NOTE:  As this article went to press, the Biden administration announced new sanctions on Alvaro Lopez Miera, who heads Cuba’s Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces as well as the National Special Brigade of the Ministry of the Interior.  Cuba’s foreign minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla denounced the action: “I reject the unfounded and slanderous accusations by the US government against General Alvaro Lopez Miera and the National Special Brigade. They should apply to themselves the Global Magnitsky Act [a law passed by Congress in 2012 to punish Russia for the death of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky] for the daily acts of repression and police brutality which cost 1,022 lives in 2020,” a reference to the number of civilians killed by police in the US last year.  Biden also announced a review of the family remittance policy and a commitment to re-staff the Embassy in Havana.  Biden is playing a dangerous political game, risking an uncontrollable immigration crisis like the 1980 Mariel boatlift which likely cost Jimmy Carter re-election.  “This is just the beginning,” Biden warned. 

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Zapatista Delegation to Europe https://ausm.community/zapatista-delegation-to-europe/ https://ausm.community/zapatista-delegation-to-europe/#respond Sat, 12 Jun 2021 14:56:00 +0000 https://ausm.community/?p=2849
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 Zapatista Delegation to Europe

 
Six indigenous representatives of the Zapatista movement and the National Indigenous Congress are headed to Europe – by boat!  The 421st Squadron, so-named because it includes four women, two men, and one person who does not identify within the binary gender paradigm, arrived in the Azores Islands on June 11th, headed to the northwestern Spanish coast.  It promises to be an arduous journey by most standards, though certainly nothing out of the ordinary for a revolutionary movement with a noble 27-year history of resistance (500 years if we trace the roots back to the original Conquista). 
 
In a sense, the Zapatistas are “conquering” Europe, in terms of hearts and minds, during a visit that will likely last several months.  During the sendoff ceremony in a small indigenous community in Chiapas, the Zapatistas said, “our traveling delegation received the mandate of the Zapatista people to carry our thoughts far and wide, that is, to share what is in our hearts. Our delegates carry with them a big heart, not just to embrace those on the European continent who are in rebellion and resistance, but also to listen and learn from their histories, geographies, calendars, and ways of being.”  For peoples who suffered five centuries of conquest and repression, this act of friendship is truly inspiring.
 
In the words of the National Indigenous Congress: “… this trip to Europe allows us the possibility of meeting with… brothers and sisters who fight and resist against capitalism and its logic of exploitation, dispossession, discrimination, and destruction of mother earth;… to hear how they organize,.. to learn from their organization,… and to identify what makes us equal in our geographic diversity and cultures. It is about recognizing, greeting, and accompanying each other to build bonds of solidarity with brothers and sisters from other parts of the world.”
 
The Zapatistas have always challenged power. Since 1994, they dealt with five Mexican presidents and their never-ending counter-insurgent measures and militarization. Despite all of this, they built a political alternative that strives for peace and reconciliation. In Zapatista communities, women are not marginalized, collective health and education serve everyone, and direct democracy is exercised daily.  Their methods reflect their social practices – the construction of autonomy in the face of exploitation and destruction of the planet.
 
Like the rest of the world, the pandemic impacted Zapatista communities. In March of 2020, the Caracoles closed temporarily to the outside world.  They confronted the pandemic collectively with simple but effective health measures. As soon as they learned how to protect themselves, they tried to resume life outside their communities. The pandemic provided important lessons for everyone by highlighting the “interconnection of the world.” Now, the “time of the people is here.”
 
For more than 26 years, the Zapatistas welcomed solidarity and visits from the world. Perhaps speaking about their accomplishments, and about what is left to accomplish, is a way to thank the world for the solidarity that they received.
 
Continuously forced to code-switch between their native languages and the national ones, and to live in cultures that are subordinate to the dominant hegemony, the Zapatistas learned that all knowledge is valuable and that no one is saved when they are alone. So it is not just a matter of returning a courtesy to visitors, but of finding common ground in different ways of resisting capitalism, to make us all stronger. 
 
This trip is part of the “Declaration for Life,” which multiple groups and individuals from all over the world signed onto in January 2021, with the intention of uniting our struggle for life without abandoning our differences. Together we will build a better world.  Together we will defeat capitalism.

 

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Venezuela and the struggle for sovereignty https://ausm.community/venezuela-and-the/ https://ausm.community/venezuela-and-the/#respond Tue, 26 Mar 2019 14:26:31 +0000 http://ausm.community/?p=1624

“We’ll know our disinformation campaign is complete when everything the American public believes is false.” William Casey, CIA Director 1981

“Every major war in the last several decades has begun the same way: the US government fabricates an inflammatory, emotionally provocative lie which large US media outlets uncritically treat as truth while refusing to air questioning or dissent, thus inflaming primal anger against the country the US wants to attack.” Journalist Glenn Greenwald

Veterans For Peace (VFP) calls on all members of the US military to refuse ILLEGAL orders to intervene in Venezuela, & urges all US military leaders to inform the president that they will order their units to stand down from preparations to invade Venezuela.

Venezuela and the struggle for sovereignty

The US-inspired coup against the elected government in Venezuela is a fiasco, born in the fetid minds of septuagenarian neocon cold warriors hoping to reestablish US hegemony in the western hemisphere after a reformist decade of “pink tide.” So far, it’s not working according to plan. Duly elected President Nicolas Maduro and the Venezuelan people are standing strong in the face of threats from a new “coalition of the willing,” though after barley a month the coalition is already fracturing. This was not the story line in late January when the US put forward a marginal neo-fascist political figure, Juan Guaido, who outrageously declared himself president of Venezuela. Most of the world, and certainly most Venezuelans, were irritated at yet another attempted coup by the empire to the north, but most mainstream media outlets predicted a quick victory for Guaido. It was not to be. As it looks now, the coup attempt is limping along, with little momentum. Could it be a failure for US neocons?

To fully understand the complex situation in Venezuela, it’s important to delve into the country’s rich history, particularly its complicated relationship with the US over the past 20 years.

Oil is key

Well before the most recent coup attempt in Venezuela, cold warriors divvied up the world in easy slices. A simple tripartite arithmetic made for easy bookkeeping – and propaganda. The “good” first world was capitalist, developed, democratic (concepts that got messier the closer we looked). The “bad” second world was communist (or at least socialist – in name), industrialized, dictatorial. The third world – more than ¾ of the world’s population – was poor, marginal, unimportant. Of course, this was always a pathetic descriptive contrivance, though adequate for propaganda purposes as leading capitalists constructed their hegemonic project.

A different, more useful, schematic may help us understand today’s world, though this time in materialist rather than moralistic/ideological terms. And perhaps it will help place Venezuela’s current situation in context. In today’s capitalist world, there are, in very broad brush strokes, three strategies for capital accumulation. Finance, information (media, entertainment, advertising and information manipulation), and relative monopolies (pharmaceuticals and airplanes come to mind, though most important is military production) are the most efficient at capital accumulation. The second accumulation strategy involves mass production of commodities in relatively mature industries in which global competition, mainly driven by cheap labor, defines accumulation opportunities. The third strategy is production of raw materials, like minerals, petroleum, and agricultural products, which provides the necessary foundations for the first two accumulation strategies.

Sometimes all three strategies are present and successful in the same country. The leading financial, media, and arms producing enterprises are found in the US, alongside (declining) mass commodity manufacture, and production of petroleum, soy beans and timber. Many countries are dominated by only one strategy, particularly in the global South. With the largest petroleum reserves in the world, Venezuela is a prime example. Without a diversified economy, petroleum enriches only a small exploitative class that is marginally capitalist, in the traditional meaning of the term as accumulation via exploitation of labor, and leaves the working masses at the mercy of international markets and political manipulation. David Harvey refers to “accumulation by dispossession.” Venezuela’s capitalist class accumulates wealth by selling the national patrimony. The sale of crude petroleum accounts for 95% of international trade, but employs only 1% of the workforce. In the early 2000s, Venezuela accounted for 15% of US oil imports. For most of the past 100 years, US oil companies, anxious to control the world’s largest petroleum reserves, dominated Venezuela’s economy and politics.

Venezuela has a fifth of the world’s proven petroleum reserves, which were nationalized in 1976 with the formation of Petroleos de Venezuela, SA. Ostensibly a state-owned operation and formal manager of national oil production, PDVSA was effectively controlled by “apolitical” career executives with strong ties to international oil companies. Lucrative joint ventures and service contracts turned into wholesale extraction by international corporations. In 1994, Luis Giusti, a former Shell executive, was appointed president of PDVSA, a post he held until 1999. During his five year stint, he signed major contracts with Exxon Mobil, ConocoPhillips, Chevron, Total, BP, Statoil and other transnational corporations, with extremely favorable conditions for the international companies, including royalties of only 1%, a minority stake for PDVSA, income tax of only 34%, and a commitment to arbitrate disputes before panels in New York. In 2000, Giusti joined the Shell board of directors – perhaps a reward for his loyal service in leading the so-called “Generation of Shell” who protected the interests of transnational energy companies, to the detriment of Venezuelan sovereignty.

The Chavez years

With this kind of neoliberal give-away as background, in 1992, a group of young nationalist idealists attempted to overthrow the widely unpopular government of President Carlos Andreas Perez. Perez was a neoliberal lackey, firmly under the influence of US President George H.W. Bush and implementing draconian IMF-ordered government cuts in social spending along with privatization regimes, particularly in the energy sector. Paratrooper Commander Hugo Chavez, part of a powerful nationalist tendency within the armed forces, led the rebellion. He was sentenced to prison, then pardoned in 1994 by Perez’s successor, Rafael Caldera. Chavez ran for president in 1998, at a time when nearly 80% of the population lived in poverty. He won the election in a landslide and immediately declared the Bolivarian revolution (Simon Bolivar led the 19th century independence movements in Venezuela, Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Panama, winning liberation from Spanish control).

Chavez wasted no time in promulgating a new constitution that formed the basis of popular socialist-type reforms.

In 2001, the Chavez administration passed a new hydrocarbon law mandating majority State control of all future contracts, plus higher royalties. Wealthy elites living on the east side of Caracas, in coordination with the largely privately held right wing media, immediately launched a campaign to discredit Chavez. In 2002, the elite alliance mounted a coup in coordination with a small sector of the military leadership. The coup began with a march against the “politicization” of oil. Demonstrators were originally headed for PDVSA headquarters before leaders diverted the mobilization to Miraflores, the presidential palace. Coup leaders kidnapped President Chavez and suspended the National Assembly, but the coup lasted only 48 hours. A million people from popular barrios in Caracas and other cities surrounded the national palace, forcing the coup leaders to hastily abandon the country.

PDVSA officials played a leading role in the next significant attack on Chavez – a three-month work stoppage that nearly shut down the oil industry beginning in December 2002. This was a battle over control of petroleum, with PDVSA executives aligned with international oil companies seeking to maximize production, while the State promoted maximization of income for social programs. The Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV) led by its president, Carlos Ortega, was key to the work stoppage. Of 35,000 permanent PDVSA employees affiliated with the union, half walked off the job, mostly managers and highly trained specialists, forcing a dramatic decrease in oil production and economic losses of some $10 billion. The CTV was a historically corrupt, thoroughly undemocratic “white” union allied with company executives. Rank and file workers from other sectors quickly joined the non-striking PDVSA workers to restore production, not an easy task given the complexity of the petroleum infrastructure and efforts by striking executives to sabotage computer systems. Once the work stoppage ended in February, progressive workers joined forces under a new union federation, the Bolivarian Workers Force, leaving the CTV a shell of its former self.

In 2004, the opposition mounted a recall election against Chavez. He won handily with nearly 60% of the vote. With renewed political clout, the Chavez administration increased petroleum royalties from 1% to 16.6%. In 2005 elections for the National Assembly, opposition candidates boycotted rather than suffering an embarrassing defeat. Chavez supporters won an overwhelming majority, giving Chavez the political power to formally declare a national socialist project focused on literacy, health care, and jobs, and an international fight against neoliberalism, particularly in Latin America.

In 2006, Venezuela’s oil minister, Rafael Ramirez, ordered pre-existing partnerships with foreign companies to comply with the 2001 law, including a minimum 51% Venezuelan ownership and higher royalties. Twenty six oil companies quickly negotiated accords that included compensation, but Exxon Mobil (under the direction of President Donald Trump’s first Secretary of State Rex Tillerson) and ConocoPhillips took their cases to international arbitration. They demanded cash compensation according to market value, while Venezuela offered compensation based on book value. Juan Carlos Boué, an internationally respected oil industry consultant and researcher, described the cases: “Supposedly motivated by a commitment to uphold the principle of sanctity of contract, the companies subsequently initiated a series of arbitrations involving some of the largest claims ever put before international tribunals. However, the bargains that the companies insist they are defending are not reflected in the agreements that they had actually signed. Thus, these arbitrations amount to an attempt on the part of these companies to use international arbitral tribunals to re-draft on their behalf the contracts they had negotiated, so as to secure a windfall (which they had never bargained for) upon their exit from Venezuela.” Used to getting his way, a livid Rex Tillerson vowed Exxon Mobil would never return to Venezuelan oil fields.

International petroleum prices increased steadily during Chavez’s early years in office, from $24 per barrel (all prices are inflation-adjusted to 2017 prices) in 1999 to $49 in 2004. In 2005, prices jumped to $63, increasing steadily to $104 in 2008, after which they declined somewhat to $88 in 2014. Historically speaking, these were high prices for oil producing countries. As one of the founders of OPEC, Venezuela exerted important, if somewhat limited, influence over the price structure. Chavez utilized oil wealth to lift millions of Venezuelans out of poverty and launch popular education, health care and housing programs. By 2015, Venezuela boasted the most equitable distribution of wealth in Latin America, according to CEPAL, with a Gini coefficient under .40.

Socialist programs initiated under Chavez included Mision Barrio Adentro (Inside the Neighborhood), which implemented health care as a universal right enshrined in the constitution. Venezuela stood in stark contrast to the neoliberal privatization of health care unleashed throughout much of Latin America. Exemplifying Chavez’s vision of South-South solidarity, Mision Barrio Adentro was staffed largely by some 20,000 Cuban medical professionals in exchange for petroleum exports to Cuba. As in other countries in the global South, Cuban doctors often provided the only available medical care in poor or remote communities.

Education is fundamental for any national development project. Chavez increased the education budget dramatically, with particular focus on two new programs. Escuelas Bolivarianas combined formal classes with extracurricular activities and free meals, and Misiones Educativas provided adult education ranging from basic literacy to university-level classes. Educational programs are central for building social consensus, especially when the national project is socialist in the midst of a capitalist world. In Venezuela it is particularly important, given the predominance of privately owned media outlets with almost universal right wing perspectives, and the prevalence of private schools for the wealthy.

Internationally, Chavez utilized petroleum proceeds to launch the sucre as a regional trade currency, and establish the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA) to promote social, economic and cultural integration throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. ALBA stood in stark contrast to US-dominated multi-lateral institutions in the region like the IMF, and represented a clear challenge to neoliberal hegemony that envisioned natural resources in the Global South as a free gift of nature for transnational capital. By 2016, PDVSA distributed a majority of its production for subsidized (in relation to international prices) internal consumption and to international solidarity projects via PetroCaribe, while about 41% was sold in the most lucrative export markets (calculations by Daniel Hellinger). Cuba received about 3% of national production in exchange mainly for medical services.

In 2011 Chavez was diagnosed with cancer. Despite his weakened condition, he campaigned vigorously for the presidency in 2012 and won re-election in October with 55% of the vote in a six candidate race. His Sunday “Alo Presidente” was the most popular television program in the country, despite a national media largely controlled by right wing elites. He was widely respected and loved for his personal warmth and strong leadership, particularly in popular barrios. Chavez passed away in March 2013. During his last public speech, he called on the people of Venezuela to elect Nicolas Maduro, a former bus driver who served as his trusted vice president, as the next president. Maduro won the April presidential election that same year, beating business candidate Henrique Capriles by about 2%.

The Maduro years

The narrow margin of victory combined with international economic conditions left Maduro in a challenging position. Petroleum prices dropped from $88 a barrel in 2014 to $43 a barrel in 2015, yet OPEC, and in particular Saudi Arabia, refused to support higher prices through production cuts. At the 2015 OPEC meeting, divisions erupted, with Saudi Arabia arguing to maintain current levels of production and Venezuela calling for cuts that would raise the international price. The Wall Street Journal reported Obama’s Secretary of State John Kerry convinced the Saudis to keep oil prices low to damage the economies of Russia, Iran and, particularly, Venezuela. In exchange, the US would support Saudi interests in Syria.

Maduro lacked the charisma of Chavez, and with declining petroleum income, the Obama administration saw an opening to regain control of Venezuelan oil. The Saudis cooperated by maintaining high levels of production, while the US and Canada were expanding new fields – oil sands in Alberta and oil shale in the Permian Basin in Texas and New Mexico. Obama announced the first sanctions regime in 2015, declaring Venezuela a “threat to national security” and targeting a small number of Venezuelan officials. Sanctions increased dramatically under the Trump administration.

While control of Venezuelan oil has always been the driving force in US policy, a number of domestic issues coincided to make Venezuela a top political interest. First, Trump appointed Rex Tillerson, still smarting from his failed business dealings in Venezuela, as his first Secretary of State. Second, Trump won the presidency in part by winning Florida with a small margin. Most of Venezuela’s elites consider Miami their second home and they helped Trump carry the state. Third, given the importance of Florida in electoral calculations, Trump was looking for a way to repair relations with Senator Marco Rubio, disparagingly dubbed “little Marco” by Trump during the presidential primaries. Rubio’s political base is in south Florida’s Cuban and Venezuelan communities, and he gladly accepted a tacit role as Trump’s shadow Secretary of State for Latin America. And finally, Trump’s opposition to socialism is clearly a foundation of his upcoming election campaign. With Venezuela in the midst of an economic crisis caused by sanctions and low oil prices, and with the mainstream media clearly in his hip pocket on this issue, what better straw man for arguments against socialism?

Trump-imposed sanctions are broad and brutal: cutting off access to oil revenues (effectively an oil embargo) and international banks, making trade with many international corporations virtually impossible, and canceling visas for government and army officials. The actions froze $7 billion of Venezuelan assets in the US, including all income from PDVSA’s US subsidiary Citgo, which operates three refineries in Texas. Ostensibly the funds are held for future use by self-appointed “president” Guaido. US sanctions also block international assets, including $1.2 billion in Venezuelan gold frozen in the Bank of England. US companies are barred from commercial transactions with Venezuela, though the Treasury Department will issue temporary licenses for certain transactions, particularly in the petroleum sector, that might otherwise damage US companies.

International prices continued to decline, reaching $29 per barrel by early 2016. In combination with production cuts caused by US economic sanctions that made it difficult for Venezuela to purchase spare parts or find international investors, oil income declined by 13% in 2017. International prices temporarily rose above the critical $50 per barrel mark in 2018, but sanctions continued to bite, and the economy tanked, shrinking about 15% in each of the past three years.
With the US as Venezuela’s principle oil customer, the embargo is expected to cost $11 billion during 2019 in lost exports, though the Maduro administration is quickly re-routing most of those exports to India, China and Russia. Even some Guaido supporters admit the debilitating impact on the population. Opposition economist and former Torino Capital Chief Economist Francisco Rodriguez said, “Sanctions have turned the crisis into a humanitarian catastrophe… I’m afraid that if these sanctions are implemented in their current form, we’re looking at starvation.” US sanctions are illegal under the charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, but this has hardly been a deterrent.

State Department coup attempt

The current battle for control of Venezuela is a battle for oil (led by the US and Venezuelan elites), versus national sovereignty and the right to experiment with a more equitable socialist system that distributes petroleum wealth to the masses. Each side is mobilizing strategies and tactics in a struggle with huge implications for the future of socialism in our world. Central to this struggle is the propaganda war, waged in the US via mainstream media. And central to their argument is a claim that Maduro is an illegitimate dictator.

If we limit the definition of democracy to regular elections with largely clean mechanics (former President Jimmy Carter applauded Venezuela’s electoral system, including use of electronic voting machines, as exemplary in the world), then Venezuela is beyond reproach. While this limited definition leaves democracy void of any genuine meaning, let’s assume for a second, as the US media does, that clean elections equal democracy. The current socialist President, Nicolas Maduro, won the 2018 presidential election with 68% of the ballots, or 5.8 million votes. Opposition candidate Henri Falcon came in second with 1.8 million votes. Just under half the country’s eligible voters participated in the election, giving Maduro active support from about 30% of the population. The same percentage of eligible voters elected Obama in 2012, while about 3% less insured Trump’s 2016 victory. Historically, Venezuelans participate at higher levels – some 80% in 2013 when Maduro succeeded his mentor Hugo Chavez. So what accounts for the low participation in 2018? A badly divided right wing opposition could not decide on a unified candidate, so they called for a boycott rather than risking defeat with a divided slate of candidates.

Since the opposition could not win the election, Juan Guaido swore himself in as president on January 23, 2019. The 35-year-old Guaido, a graduate of George Washington University and an active participant in some of the most violent anti-government protests in recent years, was a little known member of the National Assembly, a rump body whose decision-making capacity was nullified by the Supreme Court in 2017. Guaido is a member of the Popular Will party, which holds only 14 of 167 seats in the National Assembly. The National Assembly stands alongside the Constituent National Assembly, which must ratify all legislation approved by the National Assembly. The National Assembly is dominated by opposition parties, while the Constituent National Assembly is dominated by Maduro allies.

The politics surrounding the Supreme Court and the two national assemblies are complicated, but the dynamics are not difficult to understand for anyone who follows US politics. In Venezuela, the National Assembly must approve Supreme Court appointments by a two-thirds majority. With the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) in control of the National Assembly from 1999 until 2015 under Chavez and Maduro administrations, it’s not hard to imagine the party would appoint a majority of the Supreme Court justices. In the US, Trump is trying his level best to stack the US Supreme Court, a privilege afforded to the ruling party in most bourgeois democracies.

In 2015 elections, opposition parties won close to a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. The PSUV took a page out of the Republican Party’s playbook by appointing new justices before the opposition was sworn into office on January 5, 2016. Republicans in the US did something similar when the Senate denied Obama a vote on his candidate for the Supreme Court for nine months after the death of Justice Antonin Scalia. On January 2, the Venezuelan Supreme Court denied four opposition candidates seats in the Assembly after finding problems with the electoral process, including vote buying by the opposition. The situation was parallel to Florida’s infamous “hanging chads” in the 2000 US presidential election in which the Supreme Court decided in favor of Republican George W Bush. In all four cases, the political maneuvers were constitutional, while also providing the opposition with plenty of material for criticism. But there is also a very significant difference. In the US cases, the major political parties accepted the Supreme Court decisions. In Venezuela, the National Assembly ignored the Supreme Court decision regarding the four contested races, and decided to seat the candidates. The Supreme Court ruled this move unconstitutional, and invalidated National Assembly decisions thereafter.

In 2017, Venezuelans elected the Constituent National Assembly to amend the national constitution. President Chavez established a similar elected body in 1999 to draft the current constitution. Every municipality in the country elects one delegate and state capitals elect two, no matter the size of the town or city. (This electoral scenario is similar to the Senate in the US, where each state gets two Senators regardless of size.) In addition, a proportion of delegates is reserved for selection by members of sectoral organizations such as students, workers and indigenous groups. Venezuelan constituent assemblies have the constitutional authority to change the constitution and to dismiss existing officials and institutions. The opposition boycotted the election and the PSUV won a majority of seats. About 42% of eligible voters participated, comparable to non-presidential elections in the US. Given the continuing refusal by the National Assembly to recognize Supreme Court decisions, the Constituent National Assembly quickly replaced the National Assembly, with the approval of the Supreme Court, as the most important national decision-making body. This left the opposition with virtually no institutional political power, so the US adopted “plan B.” Within hours of his unique self-appointment, the Trump administration recognized Juan Guaido as President, with Canada and 11 of 14 members of the Lima Group of Latin American countries quickly following. A week later, European allies joined the chorus. Ultimately, about 50 countries recognized Guaido, or about ¼ of the countries in the United Nations representing about 20% of the world’s population. Meanwhile, Maduro enjoys the support of Russia, China, India, Turkey and many other countries.

Now that the US had an “acceptable” president, it had to figure out a way to gain control of the government. Less than a fifth of the Venezuelan population knew Guaido’s name before his self-appointment, and he had never run for election at any level. With Elliot Abrams, the erstwhile 71 year-old neocon and notorious supporter of right wing dictators since the Reagan administration, appointed by Trump as special envoy in charge of Venezuela, the strategy for “regime change” quickly turned to dirty tricks. Abrams has a long and dubious history as part of the Iran-Contra scandal, for which he was convicted of lying to Congress, and supporter of Guatemala’s notorious dictator Efrain Rios Montt. Abrams was a key architect of the Iraq war and a staunch defender of the El Mozote massacre in El Salvador in which US-supported troops slaughtered 500 civilians.

The strategy began at the information level, filling the mainstream media with lies: Maduro was a dictator, human rights abuser, incompetent administrator, and corrupt leader. Venezuela’s privately owned right wing media was already on board with this story line, and the US media quickly parroted the worst lies. The claim that Maduro is a dictator is particularly laughable. With the exception of one state-run TV station, almost every other major media outlet in Venezuela is privately owned and closely aligned with the right wing opposition. They publish and broadcast freely every day, without censorship. Guaido freely travels around the country, even making a week-long trip through Latin America, claiming to be president. He is now back in Venezuela making speeches, organizing rallies, and lobbying various interest groups. Opposition protest marches regularly clog major thoroughfares, with police intervening only when violence breaks out. Maduro must have skipped some key classes in dictator school! There’s no doubt Maduro plays hardball politics (who doesn’t?), but always within the limits of constitutional authority.

Initially, the lies predominated, including the arguments that Maduro’s days are numbered and the vast majority of Venezuelan citizens oppose his presidency. US and Venezuelan media tried to invent a humanitarian crisis, with video of Venezuelans searching for food in trash bins accompanied by heart-wrenching commentary. (This author saw the same thing last week at a train station in Chicago, one of millions of lamentable incidents that, in other contexts, are not mobilized to justify a coup.) Stories of a historically unique refugee crisis are harder to sell, given the border rhetoric of the Trump administration, but that hasn’t stopped US media from trying. About 2.7 million Venezuelans, from a population of 32.6 million (8%), left the country in the past five years. By comparison, about 20% of Mexico’s population lives in the US, with Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador and Haiti close behind.

To prove the humanitarian thesis, Guaido mounted an aid campaign, with US military planes transporting food and medicine to Columbia where trucks would transport it across the border into Venezuela on February 23 under Guaido’s tutelage. Guaido claimed half a million people would show up at the border to accompany the aid shipment, and Venezuelan troops would abandon their posts in mass. Hoping to attract huge crowds, Guaido convinced British billionaire Richard Branson to throw a party the day before on the Columbia side, featuring some of Latin America’s most popular musicians.

The plan failed miserably. About 5,000 people showed up for the concert, and perhaps 700 accompanied the aid trucks the following day. Between a dozen and 350 Venezuelan troops (depending on the source) abandoned their posts around this time, from a total of 500,000 troops – hardly the mass defections promised by Guaido. With the initial strategy in tatters, the opposition tried to provoke Venezuelan troops guarding the border, hoping to create a crisis that would generate more support. Some 200 armed paramilitaries, led by retired Venezuelan General Cliver Alcala, and working under strategic direction of Secretary of State and former CIA boss Mike Pompeo, tried to join the aid accompaniment. But Columbian officials forced the paramilitaries to back down after discovering the plan at the last minute.

With the paramilitary plan aborted, someone set fire to one of the aid trucks, then tried to blame it on the Venezuelan army and President Maduro. US media quickly picked up the story, followed immediately by outrage from the US political class. Marco Rubio used the fire to criticize Maduro within minutes of the occurrence. There was only one problem. Opposition protestors started the fire. More than a week later, the New York Times got ahold of video footage showing an errant Molotov cocktail thrown by opposition protestors was responsible. The same footage was available for days beforehand on social media, but most mainstream outlets were happy to let the lie run, instead broadcasting footage selectively edited by Columbian sources to implicate the Venezuelan military.

The story of humanitarian aid was itself a sham. The Trump administration reportedly sent about $20 million in food and medicine, a pittance in comparison to the economic damage caused by US sanctions estimated at more than $30 billion. The International Red Cross refused to accompany the aid, declaring it an overt political action. It turns out the shipment contained mostly food, a few medical supplies like rubber gloves, and, curiously, wire and nails, which opposition forces used in the past at demonstrations to decapitate pro-Maduro citizen militias who often travel on small motorcycles (more on citizen militias below). Meanwhile, Russia, Cuba and China delivered genuine humanitarian aid, without the political fanfare. In any case, the humanitarian “crisis” reported by western media is a colossal exaggeration. Journalist Max Blumenthal reports a generally tranquil country with some occasional shortages. All in all, the “humanitarian aid” tactic turned out to be a fiasco. If anything, it demonstrated the lack of popular support for Guaido, and an abysmal lack of knowledge on the ground by US officials.

Over the following weeks, Maduro and Guaido called for a series of competing rallies, mostly in Caracas. In general, the Guaido rallies are held in the tony eastern section of the city, while Maduro supporters generally gather in the popular barrios or near Miraflores. Inevitably, the Maduro demonstrations are larger, sometimes much larger, though one could never discern this from reports in the mainstream media.

With pro-Guaido demonstrations losing steam, the US and its allies needed a new tactic. Constant threats of military intervention became increasingly incredible as US allies quietly made it clear they would not support it. Even right wing governments in Brazil and Columbia are unlikely to favor a US invasion. As bordering countries, they would most likely suffer the consequences of millions of refugees if war breaks out. Given the dirty history of imperialist projects in the South, there is little stomach for US military invasions in Latin America. The so-called “coalition of the willing” would likely splinter. This does not mean an invasion is out of the question. Trump may want a war to distract attention from his abundant legal problems, and his foreign policy is in the hands of neocon cold warriors who staked their reputations and political futures on regime change in Venezuela. Guaido himself is increasingly looking to the US military to resolve the situation. This makes for a dangerous situation that could throw Venezuela into a prolonged war along the lines of Vietnam. The coalition of the willing may turn out to be only the United States, but that could easily be enough to set off a deadly civil conflict that could last for years.

In mid-March, Guaido and his US allies apparently turned to a tried and true tactic – disruption of the State electrical system, leaving most of the country without power for five days. We say “apparently” because all the details are not yet known, but evidence increasingly points to sabotage. Guaido and the Trump administration blame the extended blackout on delayed infrastructure maintenance and government incompetence. In a country suffering serious economic hardships due to the US oil embargo, it’s not hard to imagine a State forced to juggle financial priorities. In recent years, temporary local power outages have been fairly common, not unlike many Southern nations with economic problems (this author lived in Mexico for a decade where power outages were common). Most likely, some maintenance was postponed, but this doesn’t explain five days without electricity. Some experts suspect a Stuxnet style attack (Stuxnet is the US-Israeli computer virus that damaged Iran’s power system). Others point to a fire that may have damaged distribution lines. At least one power station in Caracas blew up from unknown causes. Most speculation centered on the Guri dam, source of 70% of the country’s electrical power and a relatively easy target for a sophisticated cyber-attack. In any case, the full story may come out soon. The Maduro administration promised to file a formal complaint with the UN High Commission on Human Rights. Meanwhile, the government initiated largescale distribution of food and drinking water to mitigate the most serious consequences of the outage.

The blackout may backfire badly on Guaido and his US allies. While no one in Venezuela is happy with the lack of electricity, many are blaming the opposition, as support for embattled Marudo appears to be increasing in popular barrios. Widespread blackouts in 2008, 2013 and 2018 lasted only six to ten hours, making the thesis of faulty maintenance hard to sustain. The Maduro administration certainly gains nothing from keeping the population in the dark, while the US may have hoped to spark a general uprising by creating a national crisis. Guaido may have already implicitly accepted responsibility when he declared, “the lights will come back on when the usurper Maduro is overthrown.”

On March 11, the State Department suddenly and inexplicably decided to pull all diplomatic personnel from the country. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared their presence in Venezuela “has become a constraint on US policy.” Perhaps, though it could also be interpreted as a de facto recognition of the Maduro administration, which cut diplomatic relations in January and demanded the withdrawal of US personnel simultaneous with the removal of Venezuelan diplomatic staff from Washington. Could this be a preparatory step toward a military invasion? Is this a move to protect State Department personnel from popular outrage in anticipation of the government implicating the US in the blackout? Or perhaps the US is abandoning Guaido? Without ready consultation with his bosses in Washington, Guaido is likely to be increasingly isolated.

Venezuela faces challenges

While Guaido and his handlers have been working overtime, Maduro and his allies are certainly not sitting on their hands. The 500,000 strong Venezuelan military, steeped in powerful nationalism from the days of Chavez, is unified in its support of Maduro and in opposition to US imperialism. In addition, Venezuela has perhaps 200,000 armed and trained civil militias whose defense of socialism is unquestioned. Colectivos, part of the civil militias, are mobile popular forces from the most pro-Chavista barrios. They are widely feared in wealthier neighborhoods where they often arrive on small motorcycles to dismantle road blockades or disarm thugs. This civil-military alliance is key to the defense of socialism in a hostile world. Civil militias form part of a survival strategy that has been successful in Cuba for six decades, and continues to be a defensive bulwark for the island nation. This may not be the recipe for socialism envisioned by idealists, but it is the hard reality confronting Venezuela and every other socialist revolution in today’s context.

Some on the “Left” in the US are willing to stand up for Venezuelan sovereignty, but are quick to dismiss Maduro. He is accused of mismanagement, corruption, and human rights abuses, allegations that, in general, don’t take into consideration the material conditions in Venezuela, and that play into the hands of US imperialism. A country that depends on oil sales for 95% of its trade, and that can’t produce sufficient food or medicine internally, will inevitably find itself with limited options if it tries to build a society in opposition to capitalism. Even a brilliant analyst like Noam Chomsky can fall into idealist interpretations that dismiss Chavez and Maduro. His critiques include:

  • “failure to change the colonial economy … overwhelmingly based on oil – it was not diversified.”
  • “a serious failure of the Chavez government was not to put aside reserves during the period of high oil prices”
  • “[Chavez] left the capitalist class untouched, allowing themselves to enrich themselves”
  • “Maduro’s own policies have been awful in many respects – economic, repression and others” (though Chomsky recognizes these policies have been implemented in the face of constant subversion)

We don’t mean to take Chomsky to task. In his short YouTube talk, he critiques the impact of the media, both US and Venezuelan, and the two coup attempts against the socialist government. Chomsky is a dazzling analyst with an impressive grasp of history, yet here he seems to repeat some of the simplistic tropes typically mobilized by the mainstream media.

Even under the best of circumstances, diversification of an economy heavily dependent on one natural resource is a multi-generational project, made even more difficult when the existing economy is based on US technology no longer available because of the embargo. Cuba learned this lesson the hard way, switching from US to Soviet technology after 1960, then abandoning Soviet equipment after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Putting aside a rainy day fund is a great idea, but the reality of building socialism with the US breathing down your neck means you have to deliver on promises that will improve the lives of the poor majority, thereby beginning the political transition from class in itself to class for itself. Admittedly Venezuela had some limited opportunities to stash reserves, though some of these reserves held in foreign banks disappeared with the US embargo (for example, gold reserves in Britain). In any case, it is doubtful the country could have saved enough to overcome the current double barrel attack of US embargo and low oil prices.

Both Chavez and Maduro left the capitalist class largely, though not completely, untouched. The few cases where Chavismo took on capitalist power directly are noteworthy. When the revolutionary project gained control of PDVSA, it lost many of the highly trained elite workers who made the complicated oil infrastructure function. This put a dent in production from which the country has yet to recover. Every battle with the capitalist class (or allies in the educated middle class) has repercussions. Perhaps Chomsky is correct. The capitalist class should have been destroyed. After all, this is the recipe that Marx advocated – there is no such thing as revolution via reform. But that would have opened the revolutionary government to charges of human rights abuses. In a battle of property rights versus the right to eat, have a home and live in dignity – in any battle between rights – the winner is decided by force. In this context, it’s not hard to predict counter-revolutionary activities by hired or CIA-aligned forces. There are no set recipes for building socialism. Every context is different. Bold, intelligent experimentation offers the only way forward – exactly what Chavez and Maduro have done. Mistakes are inevitable, and should be critiqued while simultaneously searching for solutions that lead to a better socialist society, but this is very difficult in the context of constant attacks from the US and the local bourgeois.

Future possibilities

US officials driving Venezuela policy – Senator Marco Rubio (with his presidential ambitions still intact), National Security Adviser John Bolton, and special envoy Elliott Abrams — continue to put on a brave face, tweeting daily about Maduro’s certain departure, while simultaneously increasing economic and diplomatic pressure. But Maduro’s demise, once reported breathlessly in US media as inevitable, is now questioned, even occasionally in the mainstream media. The New York Times was first, but the Gray Lady seems to find it necessary to toe the official line in most reporting. In general, the mainstream media continues to abrogate its duties as the fourth estate.

Journalists on the Left, particularly those with firsthand knowledge of Venezuela, like Max Blumenthal, Abby Martin, Anya Parampil, and Greg Palast, were among the first to throw serious shade – and it looks like they may be prescient. With Guaido losing steam and his supporters losing interest (elites are not known for their long term commitment to street demonstrations), there now appear to be two possibilities. Maduro could negotiate a tentative peace and slowly rebuild the economy with support from Russia, China, India and Cuba. Or the US could intervene militarily or clandestinely, which would likely precipitate a long and devastating war, especially if the US mobilizes Columbian paramilitary forces ala the Contra war in Nicaragua in the 1980s. Avoiding this second scenario necessitates a face-saving negotiated stratagem and, simultaneously, imposing a high political cost for the neocons.

For the people of Venezuela, negotiations offer the best hope. The Maduro administration has been savvy in not closing diplomatic avenues, even meeting with unsavory characters like Elliot Abrams. Negotiations will not be simple. Maduro is unlikely to agree to rapid new elections in violation of the constitution. In any case, the opposition has never participated in elections unless they are guaranteed a win, and Maduro is unlikely to deliver those conditions on a silver platter. The right, both in Venezuela and the US, is dug in, though this may change as Guaido’s lack of standing in Venezuela becomes increasingly clear. He represents a minor party on the extreme right. Will other elite parties unite behind him? Unlikely, given the factional dealings of the Right in recent years.

For the US, negotiations may be the only available face-saving approach. One of the unforeseen consequences of this ill-conceived coup is the newly forming alliances that challenge US dominance, exemplified by the groundbreaking work done by Venezuela’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Arreaza. He is organizing a group of United Nations members in defense of the fundamental principles that undergird the international organization, including respect for sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs. Russia, China, India, Turkey, Cuba and many other countries are finding common cause in opposing the US-sponsored coup, to the point where some former allies may abandon the US club in search of more palatable alternatives. There is a new boldness in a world in which the Trump administration seems to be squandering the historic global influence of the US. Could this be the most recent example of US hegemony on the wane?

If neocons and their allies are to pay a political price, it is the responsibility of solidarity actors with ready access to the US political system and public opinion. In the US, the Alliance for Global Justice, the ANSWER Coalition, US-Venezuela Solidarity, the United National Antiwar Coalition (UNAC), and Code Pink all play important roles in grassroots organizing. For the US Left, Venezuela is critical for defense of socialism, sovereignty, and the right to build alternatives to capitalism. National Security Advisor John Bolton, one of the principle authors of the coup attempt, also has Cuba and Nicaragua in his sites. If his “troika of tyranny” (do our tax dollars really pay the salary of someone who invents these asinine alliterations?!) can withstand US power, the message for working people struggling for liberation in other countries would be powerful. And the message in the US would be equally significant. Venezuela is today’s proving ground for socialist alternatives. Venezuela must be defended.

For more information on Venezuela, check out these sources:
Max Blumenthal, journalist, The Grayzone
Abby Martin, journalist
Anya Parampil, journalist, MintPress News
Greg Palast, journalist, BBC
https://venezuelanalysis.com
The Intercept
Ron Paul Liberty Report, for a strictly non-interventionist, libertarian approach that may appeal to some on the Right

 

Author: Thomas Hansen, PhD
Autonomous University of Social Movements

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Samir Flores, opositor al Proyecto Integral Morelos https://ausm.community/samir-flores-opositor-al-proyecto-integral-morelos/ https://ausm.community/samir-flores-opositor-al-proyecto-integral-morelos/#respond Sat, 02 Mar 2019 00:22:13 +0000 http://ausm.community/?p=1619 Este 20 de febrero la página de Enlace Zapatista publicó un comunicado informando del asesinato de Samir Flores, opositor al Proyecto Integral Morelos (PIM), y delegado “desde hace muchos años” ante el Congreso Nacional Indígena. Samir Flores, miembro del Frente en Defensa de la Tierra y del Agua, era fundador de la radio comunitaria Amiltzinko, padre de cuatro niños, y activo promotor de cultivos orgánicos.
El mismo día del asesinato, el Presidente Manuel López Obrador lamentó el crimen, pero aseguró que no suspendería la consulta, programada para el fin de semana (23 y 24 de febrero), acerca de la puesta en marcha de la termoeléctrica de Huexca, una de las partes centrales del PIM.

Una breve revisión de prensa indica que el proyecto fue aprobado por las Secretarías de Energía (SENER) y Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (SEMARNAT) en 2009, sin someterse a consulta, ni notificar siquiera a las poblaciones que serían afectadas por su construcción. Dicha construcción comenzó en 2010, y pronto provocó inconformidad. El PIM consistiría en:

  • Dos centrales termoeléctricas ubicadas en la comunidad de Huexca, Morelos
  • Un gasoducto de 160 kilómetros para transportar 9 mil millones de litros de gas natural diarios, que atravesaría Tlaxcala, Puebla y Morelos
  • La instalación de una línea eléctrica de 20 kilómetros a la subestación de Yautepec.
  • Un acueducto desde el municipio de Ayala a Huexca, con una longitud de 12 kilómetros, con el que se pretende dotar de 50 millones de litros de agua diarios a la termoeléctrica.

El PIM también contempla la ampliación y construcción de autopistas, la rehabilitación de vías férreas, así como la ampliación de dos corredores industriales ya existentes. Si bien la termoeléctrica de Huexca es propiedad de la CFE, fue concesionada a las empresas españolas ELECNOR y ANAGAS y a la empresa italiana BONATTI para la construcción del gasoducto, y ABENGOA, para los trabajos y la operación de las termoeléctricas.

A pesar de la escasa información que caracterizó en todo momento la construcción del gasoducto y la termoeléctrica, los pobladores de las más de 60 comunidades campesinas afectadas, consideran que no se evaluó adecuadamente el impacto ambiental que tendrá en su calidad de vida. A los habitantes de Morelos les preocupa el probable desabasto de agua, así como la contaminación de la que se usará en la termoeléctrica, mientras que a las poblaciones de Puebla y Tlaxcala les alarma el incremento del riesgo en que viven, al colocar un gasoducto no solamente en zona sísmica, sino en las faldas de un volcán activo: el Popocatépetl. (Información publicada en: ADNPolítico; Grieta, medio para armar, El País, entre otros).

A lo largo de los diez años que han transcurrido desde que se aprobó el PIM, la construcción de diversas etapas del mismo han sido suspendidas en distintas ocasiones, ya sea por procedimientos de amparo que interpusieron algunos ejidos de poblaciones afectadas, o directamente por la movilización y bloqueo de caminos para impedir las obras, en otros casos. Las amenazas, golpes y encarcelamiento de los opositores se repitieron. También fue creciendo la vinculación de los afectados en redes de resistencia.

Al mismo tiempo, algunos miembros de la clase política eventualmente mostraron un tibio apoyo a los opositores, incluyendo, entre otros, al entonces Senador Manuel Bartlett Díaz, quien en abril de 2014 propuso al Senado que expresara en un punto de acuerdo su preocupación por los impactos sociales y medioambientales que provocaría el PIM. Fue rechazado. En mayo de 2014, el entonces dirigente nacional de Morena, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, prometió que apoyaría a los habitantes para que no se construyera la termoeléctrica, y calificó de agravio que quisieran imponerla.

La resistencia se organiza fundamentalmente en el Frente de Pueblos en Defensa de la Tierra y el Agua, Morelos, Puebla y Tlaxcala; y en la Asamblea Permanente de los Pueblos de Morelos. Todas sus formas de lucha son pacíficas, mientras que la respuesta del Estado es violenta. También en mayo de 2014, el Frente de Pueblos en Defensa de la Tierra y el Agua, escribía:

“(…) se han encargado de difundir, a través de operadores e instituciones (CFE, SEMARNAT, diputados, senadores, presidentes municipales, entre otros), la idea de que el progreso y el desarrollo llegará a nuestros pueblos si aceptamos el proyecto. De que a cambio de vender la tierra va haber más despensas, carreteras, escuelas, alumbrado público, proyectos productivos y programas.
La CFE plantea un contrato de “renta” que va de 25 a 30 años, pagando de 150 a 300 pesos el metro cuadrado. Este contrato comprende el uso de 10 metros de ancho para la instalación del ducto –el largo depende de la extensión que ocupe el gasoducto en el terreno afectado. Lo que no dice la CFE es que en realidad se trata de un contrato de compraventa que no sólo abarca los 10 metros de ancho, pues la propia normatividad de la paraestatal establece un paso de servidumbre que comprende un total de 15 metros por cada lado. Además, la reglamentación de “seguridad” impide sembrar y construir a no menos de 30 y 500 metros respectivamente de cada lado del ducto.
La CFE no toma en cuenta a la población y se presenta como una industria de desarrollo y progreso, pero nosotros sabemos que este tipo de progreso y desarrollo es el que desde siempre han prometido y del que solo somos parte al momento de perder la tierra y la seguridad de nuestras familias. El desarrollo que plantean es el sinónimo del despojo y la explotación de nuestro trabajo y nuestra gente. (…) Ante esta situación, las comunidades hemos respondido con organización y trabajo: mediante asambleas comunitarias donde se discuten los riesgos y problemas que provocaría dicho proyecto, los pueblos se pronuncian en contra del PIM. (…) Además, a través de la construcción de medios de comunicación autónomos como las radios comunitarias, campañas informativas de concientización a través del arte, la cultura y la historia es como se fortalece la conciencia de los pueblos sobre la importancia de la tierra y la unidad del trabajo organizado.
Pero cuando el gobierno ve que su mentira no funciona comienza una serie de acciones que tienen como objetivo principal provocar la desorganización del trabajo colectivo. Comienza con la compra de conciencias, la división en los pueblos, el hostigamiento y el encarcelamiento de nuestros compañeros.” (Grieta, medio para armar)


Pese a la propaganda oficialista que oculta datos no favorables al proyecto, las organizaciones en resistencia han logrado demostrar que los habitantes de los tres estados se verán afectados de diversas maneras. En marzo de 2018 la Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (CNDH) emitió una recomendación a la SEMARNAT, a la CFE y a la Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas (CDI) por violaciones a los derechos a la consulta previa, libre, informada y culturalmente adecuada para pueblos y comunidades indígenas.

Sin embargo, en febrero de este año el conflicto comenzó a escalar en Morelos. El presidente Andrés Manuel López Obrador anunció el 6 de febrero que el proyecto se sometería a consulta, luego de reconocer que los derechos de las comunidades fueron atropellados, que hubo represión, y campesinos presos (“Lo hicieron los gobiernos anteriores, muy mal. Ahora se quejan los expresidentes, pero que culpa tengo yo de la manera en que procedieron”), pero que había que considerar la inversión hecha por la CFE de 25 mil millones de pesos. Grupos civiles, investigadores universitarios y Jorge Zapata, nieto del general Emiliano Zapata, ratificaron su rechazo a la puesta en operación de la Planta Termoeléctrica de Morelos y consideran que la consulta ciudadana que propone el presidente de la República, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, para resolver el conflicto social está “amañada” porque, dicen, no cuenta con la participación de instituciones electorales, personal capacitado, boletas foliadas y una organización formal. (Información de El Universal y Proceso)

El 10 de febrero, al término de la visita de AMLO a Cuautla, el Congreso Nacional Indígena-Concejo Indígena de Gobierno se pronunció enérgicamente contra el Proyecto Integral Morelos y la consulta ciudadana simulada del 23 y 24 de febrero:

“Estas consultas están hechas a modo para concretar el despojo y llevar la muerte a nuestros territorios…Suplantan la voluntad de los pueblos, diluyéndola en una presunta consulta amplia y ciudadana, como si la voluntad de los dueños, poseedores y guardianes del territorio no valiera…Es racista y clasista porque no toma en cuenta los modos y formas propias de toma de decisiones de los pueblos indígenas, campesinos y organizaciones populares…Es invasora, porque son los pueblos originarios, ejidos y comunidades directamente afectadas, las que en el ámbito de su autonomía y libre determinación pueden decidir con legitimidad y legalidad el destino de su territorio…Es represora porque pone en una situación muy vulnerable y desventajosa a los legítimos y originarios moradores del territorio.”


El 11 de febrero el Frente de Pueblos en Defensa de la Tierra y el Agua había advertido que las declaraciones del presidente de México “en apoyo a la termoeléctrica y el discurso de descalificación y odio que realizó en Cuautla contra los defensores de la tierra y el agua (…) podrían generar mayor violencia”, por lo que le solicitaron que reconsiderara su posición y lo invitaron a dialogar para que conociera el clima de hostilidad que ha generado el PIM. En correspondencia con esta actitud, Samir Flores asistió al foro informativo que el superdelegado de Morelos, Hugo Erik Flores, realizó en Jonacatepec, en donde le cuestionaron algunas aseveraciones sobre la termoeléctrica en Huexca y el PIM. Al día siguiente sería asesinado.

Realizada la consulta en un ambiente que el presidente calificó de “polarizado”, la mayoría de los medios enfatizaron los resultados: ganó el “sí” que aprueba al arranque de la termoeléctrica, con un 59.5% de los votos a favor y 40.1% en contra (datos de Proceso, del 25 de febrero). López Obrador reconoce que aún hay que enfrentar los impedimentos legales que representan los amparos ganados por ejidatarios. Si bien se destacó la falta de participación en la consulta, pocos medios (link) destacaron las cifras: “55.000 personas de un censo que roza el millón y medio de votantes” aseguró el 25 de febrero el diario español El País. Esto significa apenas poco más del 3 y medio por ciento del padrón. Y el rechazo a la consulta fue activo: marchas, distribución de información, mítines, en algún caso quema de urnas, quizá a esto se refería el presidente con “ambiente polarizado”.

El Frente de Pueblos en Defensa de la Tierra y el Agua, asegura que la votación fue una burla a la voluntad de los pueblos afectados por el megaproyecto, pues de éstos, los que votaron, lo hicieron abrumadoramente por el no, y fue la población externa al proyecto la que sustituyó la decisión de las comunidades.

“Falta que puedan retirar el campamento zapatista de Apatlaco, falta que callen a los pueblos zapatistas de Morelos, Puebla y Tlaxcala que históricamente no se han callado cuando el Gobierno los traiciona, falta la respuesta de los pueblos indígenas, organizaciones y personas que en todo el país ven que la injusticia que se está cometiendo en el PIM se puede cometer en sus pueblos y que están indignados por la muerte de nuestro compañero Samir”. (El Financiero del 25 de febrero).

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Challenges for Cuba’s New Constitution https://ausm.community/challenges-for-cubas-new-constitution/ https://ausm.community/challenges-for-cubas-new-constitution/#respond Wed, 03 Oct 2018 15:30:09 +0000 http://ausm.community/?p=1566 Cuba is writing a new constitution, part of a lengthy process of political change that can be traced to the 6th Congress of the Communist Party in 2011. The Congress approved a document known as the “lineamientos,” a detailed domestic policy blueprint that opened certain sectors of the economy to market dynamics and “change[d] the structure of employment, reduce[d] inflated payrolls and increase[d] work in the non-state sector.” The plan was to close State enterprises if they don’t generate a profit, with the private sector absorbing laid-off workers. To date less than a quarter of the “lineamientos” have been implemented, reflecting a slow and careful process of change.

In 2016, the 7th Party Congress approved the “conceptualizacion,” a theoretical outline for economic reform, with particular emphasis on social property and the role of the socialist State. The “conceptualizacion” provided the theoretical framework for the new constitution. In June 2017, the National Assembly of People’s Power established a commission charged with preparing a first draft of the new Constitution. The Party Central Committee reviewed the draft proposal in June of this year, then passed it to the National Assembly for approval in July. Copies of the proposed constitution went on sale the first week of August for the equivalent of about US 4 cents, the cost of a local newspaper. Free copies are available on the internet. The comment period is from Aug 13 to Nov 15, after which a referendum is expected early next year.

The comment period includes public events organized, in part, by the seven mass organizations – Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women, the National Association of Small Farmers, the Cuban Workers’ Federation, the University Student Federation, the Pre-university Student Federation, and the Cuban Writers and Artists Association. Few Cubans are not members of at least one mass organization, and many are members of more than one. More than 135,000 consultations led by 7,600 pairs of trained facilitators will take place across the island and will include some Cuban communities in other countries.

Leading militants in the Communist Party of Cuba were responsible for the first draft of the Constitution. The Party and its youth sector, the Young Communist League, include about a fifth of the population over the age of 16, which indicates broad participation by the most politically active sector of the population. In evaluating the role of the Communist Party, both in the constitutional process and politics as a whole, it is important for folks from the US to draw a clear distinction with the Democratic and Republican parties, where membership can imply as little as a $25 annual donation or a designation on an electoral form. Members of the Communist Party must apply for membership, be recognized for their civic participation, attend regular meetings, and maintain an exemplary moral standing in their community. The current Constitution recognizes the Communist Party as the “leading force of society and of the state,” and the new constitution will almost certainly maintain this role as a vanguard party.
Historical context

In general, countries do not take lightly the writing of a new constitution – and Cuba is no exception. There are several reasons for this bold move. The current moment is characterized by a transition of political power from the “historic generation,” which fought and won the 1959 revolution, to a new generation, connected to the world via internet and accustomed to free education and healthcare, guaranteed employment, subsidized food and public transportation, and affordable, if scarce, housing. Raul Castro is almost certain to be the last of his generation to be President or head of the Cuban Communist Party. The transition to a new leadership, without the revolutionary credentials, moral authority, or history of socialist struggle, presents a series of challenges.

Theoretical and practical foundations

Cuba is built on seven fundamental principles outlined in the “conceptualizacion”:
Sovereignty of the nation
Popular base of the Communist Party
Universal commitment to social welfare
Cuban values, with Jose Marti as perhaps the most important referent
Active engagement by socialist civil society
Limited controlled engagement in global commerce
Strong international relations, particularly in the global South and Latin America

Equity is a central element of Cuban socialist values. This was a relatively uncontentious question in the early years of the revolution when Cuba’s constantly growing economy could depend on fair trade prices for nickel, tropical fruits and other exports, plus affordable energy sources and manufactured goods via the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). But with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1990, COMECON ceased functioning – literally overnight – leaving Cuba with serious economic challenges. In the early 1990s, the economy went into recession, known as the “Special Period in times of peace.” The GNP contracted by more than a third and there were widespread shortages of food and fuel, yet the Cuban people remained committed to the socialist project.

Cuba adopted a series of economic policies meant to deal with the crisis in the short to medium term, including rapid expansion of the tourist industry financed, in part, by foreign investment, development of biotech, temporary export of human capital mainly in the form of medical professionals, and reforms in the agricultural sector to improve self-sufficiency. The results were impressive for such a poor country. From 1995 through 2008, the island nation experienced some of the highest GDP growth in the western hemisphere. In 2000, Venezuela and Cuba signed an agreement that provided 115,000 barrels of petroleum per day in exchange for the work of thousands of Cuban doctors in areas of Venezuela that were severely underserved in terms of health care. Due to recent unrest in Venezuela, by 2016 oil shipments dropped to 42,000 barrels per day.

Economic results in Cuba have been less stellar since 2009 with an average annual growth just under 2%. This isn’t bad for an economy under constant threat from the internationalized US embargo, but it is hardly sufficient to recover from the devastation of the early 1990s. Without robust economic growth, socialist equity ends up being defined by the distribution of pain rather than plenty.

Closely linked to equity is the question of exploitation, which is central to a Marxist reading of society. Marx’s labor theory of value is essentially a definition of exploitation as a social condition in which one person steals the labor of another to accumulate individual wealth. The 1976 Constitution prohibits Cubans from “procur[ing] income derived from exploitation of the work of others.” Cubans face a challenging question in moving toward limited private enterprise while maintaining a socialist understanding of wealth accumulation as a collective process that should be for the benefit of the entire society.

This leaves Cuba with a fundamental theoretical/practical problem – is socialism constructed primarily (or at least in the final instance) on the development of an abundant material foundation by whatever means, or primarily on the socialist consciousness of the population? In the final analysis, Marx was a materialist (though as a consummate dialectician, he clearly recognized a dynamic relationship between materialism and idealism), while both Fidel Castro and Che Guevara advocated the centrality of socialist consciousness. Cuba tends to emphasize central planning with limited market openings and development of culture, education, and foundational concepts like equity and socialist consciousness. By comparison, the Chinese Communist Party is taking the road of “socialist modernization” or “market Marxism.”

Each model offers a distinct understanding of work and, in particular, how to discipline labor to efficiently produce the abundance that can serve as the foundation of a socialist society in transition to communism. The market mechanism in combination with private ownership of the means of production yields a disciplined labor force through the threat of poverty (or starvation in the worst of cases), whereas socialist consciousness depends on the collective will of workers to contribute according to their abilities and take according to their needs (or according to their contributions – depending on the level of social development). Using brute production as a measure, the market mechanism has often been more effective at creating abundant surpluses, though certainly not at distributing those surpluses equitably. However, there is no reason central planning cannot be as efficient as market mechanisms. Given the development of new computer models, central planning may prove to be more efficient by avoiding the widely recognized excesses and herd mentality of private economic actors, and the regular crises that are inherent to capitalism.

Cuba clearly recognizes the importance of labor discipline and the production of sufficient surplus to satisfy an increasingly globally linked population. In 2007, in his first major speech as President, Raul Castro focused on economics. A Cuban worker receives a salary, Raul said, that “is clearly insufficient to satisfy all necessities, and hence has practically stopped fulfilling the role of assuring the socialist principle of ‘from each working according to his capacity and to each according to his work’.” That failure brings “social indiscipline” – read petty theft and black market activity to make ends meet – that is “difficult to eradicate.” In 2010, Raul Castro addressed the other side of the coin when he announced layoffs of thousands of government workers and limited privatization of parts of the economy: “We have to erase forever the notion that Cuba is the only country in the world where one can live without working.” Free education and healthcare can be internalized in two contradictory and irreconcilable ways – as rights without accompanying responsibilities, or as the result of collective struggle. The first is a product of individualism, the second of collective political consciousness. With increasingly easy access to Hollywood films, US television, and other sources of capitalist propaganda, it’s not hard to understand the challenges involved in developing collective consciousness.

Segmentation of the economy into tourist sectors, where workers have easy access to hard currency, and State sectors, in which salaries are paid in Cuban pesos, makes the challenge even greater. Laborers in the tourist sector can often earn as much in one day as State laborers earn in a month. While promotion of the tourist sector was important for economic recovery after the demise of the Soviet Union, it came with a price in terms of decreasing equity and socialist commitment. This is part of the challenge for the new Constitution.

Given the impact of the US embargo and the existence of counter-revolutionaries in south Florida intent on returning Cuba to a purely capitalist path, unbridled “market Marxism” may not be an option for socialist Cuba. The US embargo began in 1962, inspired by a State Department official who proposed “a line of action that makes the greatest inroads in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and the overthrow of the [Castro] government.” The embargo is nothing short of a recipe for capitalist counter-revolution. Over the past six decades, the cost to Cuba has been about US$130 billion in today’s dollars. For a country with a current annual GDP of less than US$90 billion, the impact is substantial.

With a huge land mass and a fifth of the world’s population, China is building an efficient market economy with a mandate to avoid “social tension” (ie, class conflict). Given an island with 11 million people only 90 miles from Florida, is this even an option for Cuban socialism? China is concerned mainly with containing internal class conflict, whereas, a priori, Cuba must concern itself with class conflict initiated from the US. While Cuba is in the process of moving carefully into some market mechanisms, the heights of the economy will remain centrally planned and controlled. In China, “market Marxism” is grounded in social unity, foreign investment, and increased trade characterized by a robust integration with global markets. With the US embargo in place, these are not realistic options for Cuba. Cuba’s understanding of a Marxist/Leninist system is grounded in class struggle, sustainability, closely controlled foreign investment, a nationalist private sector, and international solidarity, particularly in Latin America. The new constitution will outline the legal framework required for limited markets while confirming the socialist nature of the State and the leading role of the Communist Party. As Raul Castro reminded during the 7th Party Congress, “We cannot ignore the influence of powerful foreign forces who call for the empowerment of non-state forces to try to create agents of change in hopes of ending the revolution and socialism in Cuba.”

Provisions of the new constitution

In economic terms, the new constitution will provide legal foundations for private businesses and their ability (limited) to contract wage labor, plus the right to own private property. Already, new regulations for private enterprises are scheduled to take effect in December. According to William LeoGrande, an academic based at American University, “they have two broad purposes: to enable the state to capture a greater share of the revenue that private businesses generate, while also minimizing illegal behavior and protecting public safety; and to limit the growth of individual businesses in order to prevent the accumulation of wealth and property.” The new regulations will crack down on tax evasion and black market transactions that have become rampant in the private sector, while also providing a solid legal foundation for legitimate enterprises.

The new Constitution will legalize same-sex marriage, reflecting a cultural change generations in the making. For more than a decade, Raul Castro’s daughter, Mariela Castro-Espin, has assumed a leadership role in promoting LGBTQ rights as head of the State-sponsored National Center for Sex Education (CENESEX). Where once revolutionary governments sent LGBTQ people to re-education camps, now the State, along with NGOs and community-based organizations, are leading a society-wide re-education campaign that lends credence to the importance of education in consciousness raising. Mariela said, “Before, there was prejudice against talking about these things. Eleven years ago we started holding seminars about homophobia and transphobia. And that helped to pave the way for dialogue among the population.” Newly appointed President Miguel Diaz-Canel was an early supporter in Villa Clara Province where he mobilized Party resources and his own political clout to support an LGBTQ cultural center, the first of its kind in Cuba.

The Constitution will restructure the State in important ways. The new positions of Prime Minister and provincial Governors will handle the day-to-day administration of State policies, while the President will be in charge of strategic development and the overall direction of the country. Similar to parliamentary systems or the US Electoral College, the President will be elected by the National Assembly rather than direct popular vote. The Prime Minister will be nominated to a five-year term by the President and approved by the National Assembly. There will likely be a third President overseeing both the National Assembly and the Council of State. The National Assembly meets only twice a year under normal circumstances, while the Council of State is in permanent session and is responsible for many of the executive functions of the State. In general, the idea is to separate long-term strategic planning and policy development from direct implementation, thereby establishing results-based accountability.

The new constitution will likely be in place sometime next year.

Author: Thomas Hansen, PhD
Autonomous University of Social Movements (AUSM)

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Mexico and AMLO https://ausm.community/mexico-and-almo/ https://ausm.community/mexico-and-almo/#respond Tue, 28 Aug 2018 14:33:16 +0000 http://ausm.community/?p=1560 On July 2, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador of the recently formed Morena Party swept to victory in Mexico’s presidential election with 53% of the vote, the first time since 1982 that a candidate won more than half the vote. His closest competitor, Ricardo Anaya of the National Action Party (PAN), took 22%, while Jose Antonio Meade, candidate for the PRI though not a member of the party, finished with 16%. Morena also replaced the PRD as the leading party in Mexico City, capturing the Mayor’s office and a majority of the local assembly. Mexico City’s Mayor is often considered the second most important political figure in the country.
AMLO was ahead in polls throughout the campaign, but even so, the breadth of the victory, including majority control in both houses of Congress, caught many observers by surprise, although apparently not Mexico’s political class. Prior to the election, and at the invitation of Lopez Obrador, many previous stalwarts from the opposition abandoned their parties to run on the Morena ticket. Even important elements of the business class joined the Morena effort, led by Monterrey industrialist Alfonso Romo, who will serve as AMLO’s Chief of Staff. During his first two presidential runs, Lopez Obrador faced opposition from a united business class. This time he made sure to highlight his pro-capitalist credentials in the proper forums, guaranteeing that he would not challenge privatization of petroleum or the construction of a new airport. These will likely be Mexico’s biggest boondoggles ever.
After six years under PRI President Enrique Pena Nieto, probably Mexico’s most unpopular President, preceded by 12 years of PAN leadership that resulted in historic violence related to an uncontrollable “war on drugs,” Mexicans were ready for change. But will they get it?
In Mexico, politics is practically synonymous with corruption. Lopez Obrador ran on a platform denouncing corruption, electoral fraud and economic mismanagement, yet many Morena candidates came straight out of the PAN, PRD and PRI. AMLO himself started his political career in the PRI in his home state of Tabasco, then moved to the PRD for his first two presidential runs and his stint as Mexico City mayor, before founding Morena in 2014.
Almost immediately AMLO’s former party, the PRD, began to see defections. By July 2017, some 45,000 PRD militants had renounced their membership to join Morena. Even founders of the PRD abandoned the party, including Rey Morales Sanchez, a party leader in Oaxaca; Pablo Gomez, arrested during the 1968 student movement and later a career politician holding elected posts at the federal level and in Mexico City; Dolores Padierna, another career politician based in Mexico City; Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, a former PRIista (as are many PRDistas) who held many government posts under both parties; and even Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, widely considered the founding father and moral leader of the party. Party switching is not uncommon in Mexico, where political leaders are often interested in government positions that pay high salaries and offer opportunities for illicit enrichment no matter the party banner, but party switching at this level has no precedent. With the formation of Morena, the PRD became a shadow of its former self, to the point where the ostensibly leftist party aligned itself with the right-wing National Action Party (PAN) in this year’s presidential election and many state-wide races.
This spurred further defections, both from the PRD and the PAN, resulting in some surprising alignments as former PANistas joined the populist Morena. The PAN is similar to the Republican Party (before Trump) in the US with its base in big business, the petty bourgeois, and the religious right. Tatiana Clouthier, daughter of the founding father of the PAN, became AMLO’s campaign manager. PAN stalwarts, particularly in northern historically conservative states like Nuevo Leon, filled Morena electoral ballots at local and state levels. Defections included former party leader Manuel Espino Barrientos, the political operator behind the election fraud that cost AMLO the presidency in 2006, and his successor German Martinez. PAN Senator Gabriela Cuevas quit after party officials could not guarantee her a federal representative’s position in the future. This proved to be a common reason for party resignations. Shrinking party influence is leading to reduced budgets and less electoral posts, inspiring power-hungry politicians, often in the prime of their careers, to seek out Lopez Obrador. He filled Morena with opportunists, leading some observers to question Morena’s ability, or even will, to make serious political changes.
The PRI, historically Mexico’s most powerful party at all three levels, did not escape the defection parade. In February, Enrique Ochoa, president of the PRI, used the racial epitaph “prietos” to characterize the thousands of PRI militants who were leaving for Morena. With his party in rapid decline, he resigned his post in May, at the height of the presidential campaign.
Other PRI leaders joined AMLO, including Esteban Moctezuma, former Secretary of Interior under Ernesto Zedillo and an arch enemy of the Zapatista movement; Manuel Bartlett, former Secretary of Interior under Miguel de la Madrid, former Governor of Puebla, and the main operator behind the electoral fraud in 1988 that brought PRIista Carlos Salinas de Gotari to the presidency; Armando Guadiana, a major mine owner in northern Mexico; and even the family of Elba Esther Gordillo, the disgraced and (until recently) imprisoned former head of Mexico’s powerful teacher’s union, the SNTE. In a political class known for corruption, Gordillo is a case apart – a multi-millionaire aligned, at times, with the PRI, the PAN and now, apparently, Morena.
Tamaulipas, a northeastern border state and long a bastion of the PRI and PAN, is exemplary of the electoral composition of Morena. The mayoral candidate for Reynosa, Tamaulipas’ biggest city, was a former PANista from the local assembly and brother-in-law to the PAN Governor. Morena’s contenders for the cities of Nuevo Laredo, Matamoros and Tampico were all ex-PRI. Omar Salomon, a local Morena activist, claimed “imposition” of candidates went too far and Morena was at risk of being overrun by opportunists.
Lopez Obrador has been considered a “Leftist” by the mainstream press. The Zapatista movement disagrees, characterizing Lopez Obrador as the furthest right of the three main candidates. It is probably accurate to call him a populist nationalist with modest tendencies toward redistribution to stabilize a decaying society without threatening the fundamentals of capital accumulation. As Mexico City Mayor from 2000 to 2005, he was best known for three programs designed to keep everyone happy. His “segundo piso” was a massive highway infrastructure project that sped the trip from tony suburbs to downtown Mexico City. His re-development of the historic city center provided real estate tycoons, particularly Carlos Slim, one of the world’s wealthiest men, with unparalleled opportunities for gentrification and immense profits. His small monthly cash handouts to single mothers, seniors and handicapped citizens were straight out of the PRI clientelist playbook but without the corporatist organizational intermediaries. AMLO built a direct and uncharacteristically personal relationship with his “viejitos” who eventually formed part of Morena’s electoral base.
Mexico’s chattering class, pretty much across the political spectrum, is concerned about Morena’s overwhelming victory. Along with two smaller allied parties, Morena will control the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. They also won five of nine governor’s races, including the crown jewel of Mexico City where a quarter of the nation’s population lives, and Veracruz, the second most populous state. In Morelos, famous soccer star Cuauhtemoc Blanco beat the sitting PRD governor, and Morena candidates also won in Tabasco and Chiapas. Lopez Obrador is the undisputed leader of Morena and his political agenda dominates the party – up to a point.
While AMLO presents a clean public persona (he drives an older model sedan, lives in a modest apartment and eschews a personal security detail), the same cannot be said of his many new allies imported from the PRI, PAN and PRD. Mexican politics is widely understood as a path to wealth and Lopez Obrador knows how to play the game. During his years as Mayor of Mexico City, AMLO surrounded himself with some questionable characters. Perhaps best known was Rene Bejarano, AMLO’s principal political operator in the Mexico City Legislative Assembly and the husband of Dolores Padierna. In 2004, Bejarano was videotaped accepting wads of cash from businessman Carlos Ahumada, most likely for AMLO’s presidential campaign. He spent eight months in jail before being exonerated (well-connected political operatives seldom spend much time in prison, whatever their crimes), then spent the next 13 years keeping a low profile as a PRD agent, and, at least publicly, at a healthy distance from AMLO. Lopez Obrador claimed Bejarano was working “on his own” when he accepted the money, a claim that is difficult to reconcile with the facts. In any case, now he’s back, supporting his old boss and with a likely future in an AMLO administration.
Even if Lopez Obrador wants to clean up Mexican politics, with so many experienced politicians accustomed to having their fingers in the honeypot, it would seem unlikely. AMLO is promising superficial reforms, including reducing the salaries of government officials, but this kind of high publicity/low impact change is unlikely to have much of a profound effect. Government spending greases the political machine. “Si no hay obras, no hay sobras” (if there are no government programs, there are no extras) is a widely repeated truism. As President, he’ll try to manage an ideologically disparate coalition, including business-oriented PANistas, neoliberal PRIistas, and corporativist PRDistas. Even his own electoral coalition includes the liberal Labor Party (PT) and the conservative religious Social Encounter Party (PES), which is opposed to gay rights and abortion. Lopez Obrador may not have a choice but to allow corruption to buy political peace.
For the moment, let’s assume AMLO can tame rampant government corruption. That still leaves the much more important “legal” robbery known as capitalism that allows a small class of owners to steal from workers. This kind of corruption is called exploitation, but AMLO never addresses it. Lopez Obrador may be the most dangerous of “leftists,” the kind that is convinced heart and soul that capitalism is not only inevitable, but can be just and productive for the majority of humanity under the right political conditions – and it just so happens that he has the secret recipe. Hence, his political program is populist (bread and circus for the masses), nationalist (though a particularly narrow form of nationalism in which he occupies the center of attention), and adamantly pro-capitalist (favoring those members of the capitalist class who are willing to support his brand of populism).
For US residents, this formula sounds familiar, though Trump provides relatively more circus and less bread for the masses. Trump’s nationalism has characteristics distinct from AMLO’s as well, particularly its international aspects. Mexico doesn’t play at the level of US tariffs, military interventions and America-first alliance building/destruction.
In today’s post-neoliberal world, pro-capitalism requires a strong nationalist tint, not unlike Germany under Nazi influence. Neoliberalism, defined by free trade and its accompanying international institutions like the IMF and World Bank, can no longer deliver annual growth rates of 4%. Capitalist classes around the world are looking inward for their survival (read continued exploitation of labor), though with 2% (or less) growth rates, they must face increasingly restless populations. The global South is a source of raw materials and a home for environmental destruction, walled off from the “developed” world where immigrant populations become scapegoats. Trump simply dismisses immigrants and minorities, while Lopez Obrador will apparently try to buy them off with modest handouts, though he is likely to dismiss rural residents sitting atop important natural resources (read indigenous communities) if they won’t play ball.
Either way, capitalism hasn’t much future. The cyclical crises of over-production are historically resolved by war (World War II “rescued” the capitalist class from the Great Depression, but another world war might destroy us all), decapitalization of the working class (note the great recession of 2007 and post-crisis wage stagnation, which both raise the question, Can the working class be squeezed any more?), externalization of costs (not a long term viable option because of the burgeoning environmental crisis), or conquering new markets (there aren’t many left, and in any case, Mexico is among the conquered, not the conquering).
Lopez Obrador and Trump are not the only leaders who harbor these kinds of populist-nationalist tendencies. Michel Temer in Brazil, Mauricio Macri in Argentina, and even Vladimir Putin in Russia are exemplary. England’s Brexit is, at its heart, a nationalist anti-immigrant strategy, and other European countries are not far behind. Each case has its own peculiarities, but each country faces an international context that defines limited options. The response, so far, has been an ugly nationalism built on walls, both legal and physical, and scapegoats.
As is generally the case, the most thoughtful and comprehensive critique comes from Mexico’s true Left (since when did pro-capitalists like Lopez Obrador become part of the Left?) in the form of the Zapatista movement. Subcomandante Galeano recently remarked, “Faith, or the new faith that is developing at this moment, requires a [domineering] individual [read Lopez Obrador – or Trump] and a mass that will follow him. This has happened in other parts of the world at other moments, and now it is happening here.”
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Cuba “Sonic” Incidents https://ausm.community/cuba-sonic-incidents/ https://ausm.community/cuba-sonic-incidents/#respond Mon, 20 Aug 2018 03:59:22 +0000 http://ausm.community/?p=1544 Science fiction? Spy versus spy? Sabotage by a third party? Mass hysteria? Or political ploy? No one seems to know the source, much less the reasons behind, the miss-labeled “sonic attacks” reported by about two dozen US Embassy personnel in Havana. The “health incidents” took place between November 2016 and August 2017 at homes of US diplomats and in two Havana hotels, but not at the US Embassy itself. Patients described intensely loud sounds coming from a specific direction, buzzing, grinding metal, piercing squeals and humming, causing concussion-like symptoms. According to The Atlantic, the patients were “CIA agents posing as diplomats in Havana,” a common practice at US Embassies around the world. In fact, many countries post intelligence agents in their embassies.

Two additional embassy personnel returned to the US in late June reporting similar conditions, while “a number of individuals” employed at the US consulate in Guangzhou, China, reported identical health problems and were evacuated to the US in early June. In the Chinese case, the exact number was withheld by the State Department for “privacy” reasons, with no explanation offered for the differential treatment in Cuba. Two similar cases were reported in the US Embassy in Uzbekistan last November. A USAID officer based in the US Embassy and his wife reported “at least one acoustic attack similar to those experienced by the diplomats in Havana,” according to CBS News. USAID is reportedly often used as a cover for CIA agents. News about this event quickly disappeared from the mainstream media and a State Department spokesperson reported, “we can confirm that there was no incident in Uzbekistan.”

The source of the “sonic” incidents remains a mystery. A report issued jointly in July by Cuban and US law enforcement officials, part of a year-long forensic effort to determine the cause, found no scientific explanation for the health conditions, nor any evidence of intentional attacks. In late May, the President of the Cuban Academy of Scientists called for a joint Cuban-Canadian-US investigation (at least ten Canadian Embassy personnel suffered similar health problems in recent months).

Given the historically distrustful relations between the US and Cuba, the call for an impartial international scientific investigation would make sense. A report published in The Guardian in late May makes clear the perils of unilateral research that reflects possible underlying political motives:

A formal assessment of the American diplomats’ health commissioned by the US government was published in March by doctors at the University of Pennsylvania.

The preliminary report in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) describes a new syndrome that resembles persistent concussion in people who have not received blows to the head.

But in a letter published in the Journal of Neurology, Sergio Della Sala and Robert McIntosh, both neuroscientists at the University of Edinburgh, claim the US report is seriously flawed.

Della Sala said much of the evidence the doctors used to propose a new concussion-like syndrome came from six diplomats who each took 37 cognitive tests. The tests looked at visual and auditory attention, working memory, language, reasoning, movement and other cognitive abilities.

In their report, the US doctors reveal that all six embassy staff who had the full battery of tests had some brain impairment or another. But Della Sala and McIntosh say anybody who took the tests would have been classed as impaired. They point out that it is standard practice with cognitive tests to measure people’s performance against others in the population. Often, a person has to score in the bottom 5% to be considered impaired. But the US doctors set the threshold at 40%, meaning that by definition, four in 10 who take the test will be “impaired”.

Della Sala and McIntosh ran a simulation that looked at the probability of passing all 37 tests when the threshold for failure was set so high. “The chances that somebody will be without an impairment is zero,” Della Sala said. “We ran the simulation 1,000 times, and never, ever is there one single individual who appears to be normal. They are all classed as impaired.”

US-based scientists were also skeptical. Mark Cohen, a professor of neurology and pioneer in functional brain imaging at the University of California, Los Angeles, said there was insufficient evidence to link the diplomats’ health problems to the sounds they heard. “These are symptoms which are typical of many, many causes,” he said. “It is an incautious leap to presume that the cause was related to the reports of sounds heard by these diplomats.”

Rigorous scientific evaluation is difficult because US authorities have not been forthcoming with hard data. Even scientists at the University of Pennsylvania, where many of the patients were treated, are unwilling to share data with other scientists, referring requests to the State Department. According to the New York Times, only 25 percent of those evacuated from Cuba were later found to have health problems, but even this information only became public after the Times report.

There are several possible explanations for this reluctance to share information. Perhaps the US itself is responsible for the incidents, or the State Department is unwilling to expose possible CIA agents to scrutiny, or the incidents, whatever their cause, may have been mobilized for political purposes.

Fulton Armstrong, a former CIA analyst whose work focused on Cuba, said, “[US authorities] were so desperate to make their case that it was sonic attacks. This is serious stuff. You’re accusing [Cuba] of doing line-of-sight attacks with a weapon that no one knows exists. So once the political people got stuck in their own internal contradictions, it was almost impossible then to get a real serious discussion about what was going on. The administration had already decided it was going to use this – the legitimate symptoms of US government officials – for a political maneuver that looks like a lot of other political things that this administration has done, and that is, at any cost, undo what [Obama] did.”

Cuba is anxious to get to the bottom of this mystery. “We think that this could be clarified if a serious discussion is held and we exchange the information we have,” according to Mitchell Valdés-Sosa, the general director of the Cuban Neuroscience Center. All he and his colleagues have had to go on is a one-page medical summary with no test results or data included, he says. For months, the State Department has been characterizing these illnesses as the result of an attack. If this proves false, what options does the State Department have? “Once you say there’s been an attack, you can’t back up. Would they be willing to recognize that they’ve made a mistake? They’ve got themselves into a corner, and they don’t know how to pull out … The most alarming consideration is that medical data was withheld from the Cuban side to protect the patient privacy, but then it goes directly to publication [in JAMA],” he added.

Cuba demonstrated openness to a thorough investigation from the beginning, even providing a team of FBI agents with access to the homes and hotels where the incidents were reported and hosting several FBI visits to the island. Now Cuba is calling for a transparent tri-partite investigation including experts from Canada, the US and Cuba.

In a June 5th statement, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said he created a health care task force to examine “the unexplained health incidents that have affected a number of U.S. government personnel and family members stationed overseas.” The New York Times reports, “the statement left open the possibility that there have been similar events at other American embassies or consulates. One American official said he was aware of reports of isolated episodes, but that there did not appear to be any discernible pattern.” From the beginning US officials have been concerned about the possibility of similar incidents at other embassies, and the impact on diplomatic personnel and bilateral relations with other countries. Given the recent incidents in China, this may induce US officials to take seriously an investigation that would explain the mystery, though to date, this has not been the case.

In the final analysis, there may not be a clear cause to discover. After a great deal of research, Cuban officials maintain this is a case of “mass hysteria” in which members of a closed community (international diplomats living in foreign countries fit this description) influence each other in profound ways. This does not discard that the reported symptoms are real, but the wide range of reported symptoms and the fact that all patients demonstrated normal MRI brain scans (according to the JAMA report) indicates this may be a case of mind over matter, something that is not uncommon in psychosomatic research. Currently there in no known acoustic weapon that would cause the reported symptoms. Only the US and Russia are known to be working on the weaponization of sound waves. (For a full discussion of the science behind these incidents, see “Sonic Weapon Attacks” on US Embassy Don’t Add Up – for Anyone,” in Scientific American, Feb 16, 2018.)

Political motivations
While the source of these health incidents is unknown, that has not stopped US officials from politicizing the issue. In a Congressional hearing earlier this year, Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL), a Cuban-American with a well-known hatred of Cuban socialism, claimed, “We know two things for sure. People were hurt and the Cuban government knows who did it.” Sen. Bob Menendez (D–N.J.), another politician with a powerful right wing Cuban-American constituency and a long history of support for the US embargo, described the incidents as “brazen and vicious attacks” on diplomats. Sen. Jeff Flake (R-AZ), a long-time supporter of improved relations between the US and Cuba, said in January he has seen no evidence that American diplomats who suffered health symptoms while in Havana were “attacked.” Flake’s understanding is supported, to some extent, by State Department officials who cautioned that no final determination had been made about what caused the illnesses. It appears that Rubio is jumping the gun, perhaps in hopes of pleasing his right wing Cuban-American political funders in Florida and damaging any progress made in bilateral relations during the Obama administration.

The episodes played a big role in America’s current political disengagement with Cuba. Trump has proven anxious to repair relations with Republican leaders that were damaged during the presidential campaign. Among the most important leaders is Marco Rubio, disparaged by Trump before the election as “Little Marco.” Rubio built much of his political legacy on his opposition to improved US-Cuba relations, and this fits nicely with the Trump agenda to undo all that is Obama.

While the mystery remains unsolved and the debates in Congress, even within the Republican Party, carry on, it is instructive to compare the US responses to the Cuban and Chinese incidents, and to compare the US and Canadian reactions to the incidents in Havana.

The Chinese incident prompted careful words from the State Department – “The Chinese government has assured us they are also investigating and taking appropriate measures” – along with a warning that anyone experiencing “unusual acute auditory or sensory phenomena” while in China should move away from the source of the noise. In contrast, the Cuban incidents prompted angry declarations from the Trump administration, unfounded accusations from leading Republicans, the temporary removal of all non-essential diplomatic staff from Havana (which became permanent in early March), the expulsion of 15 Cuban diplomats from Washington, and State Department travel warnings leading to decreases in US travel to the island.

Cuban authorities called on the US “to desist from the continued political manipulation of the alleged health incidents that became a pretext to adopt new unilateral measures that affect the operation of the respective embassies, particularly, the rendering of consular services depended upon by hundreds of thousands of people.” The US Embassy in Havana is barely functioning with a skeletal staff and is unable to even review visa requests. Cubans applying for immigrant visas must travel to Georgetown, Guyana. Even tourist visas require travel to a US Embassy in a third country. In addition to travel costs, applicants pay a non-refundable $150 application fee, and the vast majority of applicants are rejected.

The Canadian response stands in stark contrast to that of the US. Between 10 and 15 Canadians were apparently affected by an “acquired brain injury,” the carefully diplomatic term use by Canadian officials, who ordered their diplomats not to discuss the situation publicly. Family members are no longer allowed to accompany diplomatic staff in Havana, but even this change was handled quietly and did not result in a reduction of Embassy personnel. Most notably, Canadian officials did not blame the Cuban government for “attacks” and did not issue travel warnings for Canadian tourists. Canada is the leading source of tourists in Cuba.

The Cuban government vehemently denies participation in any attack on US diplomats, and no one has yet offered a rationale for such an attack. Since the Obama administration, Cuba has been anxious to improve relations with the US. After a February visit to Cuba, Congresswoman Kathy Castor (D-FL) said, “I don’t see a motivation of the Cuban government itself to have done harm” to our diplomats. That’s because there is none. In the context of gradually improving relations between the US and Cuba under the Obama administration, there was hope initially that Trump might continue his predecessor’s openings. Cuban officials were careful not to roil the waters. Then President Raul Castro publicly offered Trump congratulations on his election victory. Bilateral cooperation on issues like illegal drug interdiction, limited trade openings, and immigration continued apace. Cuba had nothing to gain and everything to lose from an attack on US diplomats. Cuba has always been careful to protect its diplomatic relations throughout the world, a perfectly logical stance for a small country.
A conscious attack on Canadian diplomats is even harder to understand. Cuba maintains robust commercial relations with Canada and more Canadian tourists visit the island each year than from any other country.

According to travel industry experts, Cuba remains one of the safest tourist destinations in the world. A survey of 462 Americans who visited Cuba between 2017 and 2018 — conducted by Cuba Educational Travel — found that 83 percent believe the island is “very safe.” A Congressional delegation that visited the island in February insisted the island was safe for Americans and asked the State Department to eliminate the travel alert.

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Tour by the CNI “vocera” to the Zapatista Caracoles https://ausm.community/tour-by-the-cni-vocera-to-the-zapatista-caracoles/ https://ausm.community/tour-by-the-cni-vocera-to-the-zapatista-caracoles/#respond Wed, 15 Nov 2017 23:16:05 +0000 http://ausm.community/?p=1355 by By Elisa Benavides and Mariana Hernandez-Burg

In October, the Indigenous Government Council (CGI) and the communities that make up the National Indigenous Congress held the “National Work Assembly” on the grounds of CIDECI-UniTierra in Chiapas. (More info). Members of the Mexico Solidarity Network accompanied the assembly and the tour of indigenous communities that followed. Here is our report.

Participants began arriving on the 10th and 11th at the CIDECI facilities. On the 12th, organizers established work areas by themes, including Youth, Territory, Migrants, etc. The 13th was the main plenary session. After addressing the “calendar from above” (ie, the formal rules of the Federal Electoral Institute), the caravan of the CNI departed for the municipality of Margaritas. We arrived late and spent the night there, about 100 kilometers from San Cristobal.

The trip between San Cristobal and Las Margaritas is usually about two hours, but with more than a dozen buses and lots of smaller vehicles, travel times doubled. This would be the pattern during the coming days. Mechanical difficulties, extended greetings, waiting for the stragglers who needed to use the bathroom or eat, even one case in which a driver was tired of his job and threatened to abandon the caravan. The fact is that the days were long, sometimes ten hours or more. In Las Margaritas, comforted by a hot dinner offered by a solidarity collective from the community, we finally got to sleep about midnight.

From the 14th thru the 19th, an impressive series of mobilizations and public events were organized throughout Zapatista territory “as a greeting” to the IGC. During the trip from Las Margaritas to Guadalupe Tepeyac, we quickly realized we were in rebel territory. Two motorcycles managed by young people (men and women with the acronym “EMZ” on their shirts – “Motorized Zapatista Squadron”) began to accompany the vocera. Soon another motorcycle, then two more, and another two joined, surrounding the lead vehicles in a warm embrace. The motorcycles were joined by the “non-mechanical” cavalry, a series of horses and their riders. For more details and photos, visit: (http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx)

The cold and wet of the highlands were quickly left behind. In Guadelupe, the sun was bright and the atmosphere could not be more warm and lively. Not only because this population lives just 700 meters above sea level, against more than 2000 in the highlands where we began our journey, but because we imagine smiles of hope behind the pasamontanas, despite the grief and rage that overwhelm everyone by the unpunished murder of the Zapatista teacher Galeano. (Galeano was a widely respected teacher from the area, so beloved that Subcomandante Marcos assumed his name after his death. His murderers remain free, even though they’re identities are widely known.) Hope and joy give rise to a new stage in the struggle that communities have decided to follow by peaceful means, though without surrendering their weapons.

The leadership, provided by the generation that was born with the Zapatista uprising, characterized the entire trip, and began to become evident in Guadalupe. Thousands of young Zapatista were responsible for almost everything: resolving travel logistics, distributing water, assigning beds, attending to the sick, organizing receptions, taking photos, recovering lost suitcases, ensuring order and security. Thousands of young women and men raced up the steep hills, just for pure joy, at each change of the guard. It was the youth who managed the carefully planned political and cultural activities. To make it clear that they were born after the start of the millennium, they danced till dawn once their tasks were fulfilled.

The “masters of ceremony” in each of the political/cultural events were all young women. Women were also the vast majority of participants in the cultural activities – dancing, poetry, songs, different forms of theatre – although there were some men playing musical instruments, carrying messages or setting up the stage.

Another important feature of the receptions for the IGC and its spokeswoman: the EZLN and their support bases encouraged only women to take the stage, especially when the activities were “political”. At public events, the speakers were comandantas who form part of the General Command of the Zapatista Army, female members of the Juntas of Good Government, and other participants in various committees … but always women. The scenarios used for the presentation of the IGC and its spokesperson in the five Caracoles and Palenque were diverse, but in every event priority was given to the visibility of women. The CIG is composed of men and women, and they were fully supportive of their spokeswoman, but women always occupied the front seats. Women of all ages were the driving force behind public presentations of the IGC in Zapatista territory. They discussed their experiences, recommendations, and feelings. Many of the speeches are available at: (http://radiozapatista.org/?p=23254)

We arrived at the Caracol of Morelia, only minutes from Altamirano, on the 15th. Almost everything in this Caracol was rebuilt for the occasion, as the Zapatistas in the area feared the spaces at their disposal wouldn’t be sufficient. I find it hard to calculate the amount of money and work it took to prepare for 27,000 people. They simplified the explanation, saying it was the result of “20 years of collective labor.” During the welcome, the Junta of Good Government “Heart of the Rainbow of hope” in the Tzot’z Choj zone apologized for “not giving comfortable accommodation, better food or better service.”

A huge esplanade surrounded by buildings to accommodate visitors, places for the press, a clinic, cooperative shops, and baths, all covered with pine branches, and part of occupied lands from the original 1994 uprising, made for an imposing scene. One of the comandantas informed us, “Over there was the house of the patron.” Her father fled decades ago with wife and children after they’d suffered enough humiliation. She was a baby, but when she grew up she came to know the wife of the hacienda owner. The lady was dying and she asked forgiveness for having dished out abuse, confusing her with her older sister. The Comandanta forgave her to relieve her agony… in that moment of recollection, the mist seemed to confuse the ghosts of the past with threats from the present.

Or maybe not. Shortly after, Comandanta Miriam noted that in the past the hills held no interest for the bosses, and because of this, the the peons often took refuge there when they fled … there they could rebuild their lives. Now the land occupations have been awarded legal titles, an effort to displace the collective landholdings controlled by the communities: “Once again they want to take our lands and this time not only the good lands but they want everything, absolutely everything, including the mountains.” (Awarding individual land titles allows for mortgaging land which can then be lost in lean years.)

In each of the Zapatista population centers, one notes the daily evocation of historical facts, the continuous presence of the memory of those compas who have contributed to the work of creating different organizational levels. Despite the young age of organizers, militia members and support bases, the gratitude for those who began the work of organization is manifested through shouted slogans, and is preserved in the names of towns, clinics or schools.

For others, there is a place for all time in those territories: for the memory of the struggle, for the present with the word of the 156 councilmen and councilwomen of the 63 indigenous regions of the country, and for those “who wanted to attend but could not make it for reasons of health or other reasons”. The discussion of shared dreams and the construction of a common future unite them. And the immediate future is carefully protected: one of the companeras who spoke at the event almost fell from the podium and had to be rushed to a Zapatista clinic to give birth.

Crowds at the side of the road on the journey from the Caracol of Morelia to La Garrucha, deep in the jungle, seemed to be inhabited only by children with a few adult caretakers. Outside their schools, or next to the road, they watched as the contingent passed, applauding, waving and took pictures with cell phones. On the other hand, the Caracol was full of young people and adults. Yet, as in the rest of the tour, once the caravan arrived even more people joined. The huge signs of the so-called “Neutrals”, indigenous non-Zapatistas who declared their support for the CNI, who came out to support the spokeswoman for the IGC were particularly interesting.

It took some time, between the arrival at the Caracol, the accommodation of nearly 200 people who occupied the podium, and the wait for those who straggled behind. The master of ceremonies explained the reasons for the delay, and the order of the activities and speeches, which were not set in stone. Planned activities did not start until everyone arrived. It is noteworthy that despite the long wait, it did not dampen the joy and excitement that permeated the environment. All political acts included a few words of welcome by a companera from the Junta of good Government, and a speech by one of the comandantas. Sometimes they gave the mic to Marichuy immediately after the welcome, sometimes to the Commandanta, or another woman. The parents of the 43 students from Ayotzinapa, family members of the assassinated teacher Galeano, survivors from Acteal, one of the mothers of the disappeared from the collective Eureka, and always to the Councilors, especially those whose communities face attacks by mining companies or other mega projects, also had their spaces.

In La Garrucha, the mic was quickly passed to the spokeswoman, but no sooner did she begin to speak than it began to rain, a very heavy downpour that lasted about two hours, nearly until the end of the speeches. It was hot, so some journalists removed their shirts for an impromptu shower. The podium had a roof, but the public was uncovered. Marichuy asked the master of ceremonies what to do, and they encouraged her to continue, ignoring the storm. Nobody moved from their seats, but everyone (except security) began to deploy umbrellas and large pieces of plastic that formed an immense roof supported by the arms of the audience.

Someone quipped that the rain was part of the scenery. A girl responded with a smile that the truth is that when they prepared the event, they discussed what they would do if it rained, and they decided to “go prepared”… in other words, ready to get wet. Marichuy’s speech was brief, that of the comandancia slightly less so, but later there was sufficient time for dance, music and poetry, all lovingly prepared. At this point the “neutrals” had already rolled up their signs, but even they stayed. Once finished with the formal dances and the rain, the Zapatistas continued to dance until dawn.

On the 17th, we were heading to Roberto Barrios, and shortly before arriving we made one of those stops that had become routine to pull together the dispersed caravan of buses. One of the drivers again took the opportunity to complain and insist on leaving his job, or, at the very least, go directly to Palenque, perhaps because “Palenque” sounds more touristy than “Roberto Barrios”. With some apparently preferring the “Nescafe” of convenience stores, rather than the organic coffee, the “wacax” (beef) and the “tuluc” (turkey) that were prepared for us in the Caracol, we planned to meet again the next day. It took a while to rearrange luggage and stuff passengers on other vehicles. With the sun going down, we finally arrived at the Junta de Buen Gobierno and the other facilities of the Zapatista Caracol where a welcoming party waited for us with fireworks, flowers and hand lamps. Presentations and speeches in the Caracol “that speaks for everyone” were brief, since most would be repeated the next day in the city of Palenque. And besides, the basketball court was ready for dancing into the night.

The central square of Palenque was packed when we arrived the morning of the 18th. The heat was melting us (now we were at 100 meters above sea level), and the militiamen were handing out bottles of water … those destined for the Comandancia had straws. This time the audience wouldn’t include mainly support bases – it was open to the public. As with all the activities, the cultural events opened with young artists from the communities. Marichuy kicked off the speeches with a report on the problems in registering signatures that are necessary so that her name can appear on the presidential ballots. Time was already short to meet this requirement. (https://www.congresonacionalindigena.org/2017/10/23/pronunciamiento-la-asociacion-civil-llego-la-hora-del-florecimiento-los-pueblos-sabotajes-obstaculizacion-la-obtencion-del-apoyo-ciudadano-maria-jesus-patric/) In spite of the difficulties, we’ll have to redouble our efforts, she said. The people who registered their signatures in the few hours that it was possible showed great conviction and hope. With or without credentials (at the beginning many were not clear about the requirements) everyone tried to be part of the process to get Marichuy on the ballots. Then they continued with the scheduled speeches, with the comandancia advocating a future for mother earth (https://actividadesdelcigysuvocera.blogspot.mx/2017/10/palabras-de-la-comandanta-amada-nombre.html).

As in the Caracoles, the content of artistic presentations and speeches was clearly anti-capitalist, but no one seemed surprised. In fact, the laughter and applause did not sound different, although perhaps a bit stronger.

From Palenque, we returned to sleep in CIDECI-UNITIERRA in San Cristobal, with a midnight arrival for buses slowed by multiple bathroom and food stops, and an earlier arrival for small vehicles in the caravan that opted for a quicker pace to avoid the fog and the obvious hostility of the ranchers of Ocosingo. The companeros from the Highlands, with their wool skirts, smiled with relief as they went to their dormitories. The next day they could dress in their regional outfits without fear of excessive heat.

While the entire route had been surprising and left the participants full of enthusiasm, Oventic would show that the “poder convocatoria” (power to convene) of the Zapatistas would exceed the “pure curiosity” mentioned in the welcome speeches at Palenque. Attendance in Oventic was extraordinary. The access road nearly collapsed, and vehicles parked on the side of the road stretched for kilometers.

All the Oventic events were open to the public. In fact, this was the first time in years the Caracoles were open to this extent. No one could remember such large crowds in the Caracol of Oventic. Almost every welcoming speech highlighted the novelty of the situation. Speakers welcomed the National Indigenous Congress, fellow adherents to the Sexta and alternative press, while almost always rejecting the “paid media”. The fog, aka the pasamontana de los Altos, was present during the entire celebration, which was especially emotional.

October 16 opened a broad political landscape in which 40 prospective independent candidates were registered in the Federal Electoral Institute. What distinguishes Marichuy from the other pre-candidates? Many characteristics could be mentioned. These notes are only intended to be a brief chronicle of her unveiling in Zapatista territory. However, it is worth reading a response based on ideas that were repeated along the route, and reiterated by Comandanta Hortensia in Oventic: ( https://actividadesdelcigysuvocera.blogspot.mx/2017/10/palabras-de-la-comandanta-hortencia.html):

“For us, the Zapatistas, and for many other peoples, the word and the sound and the glance that have value are those of the indigenous Council of Government and its spokeswoman María de Jesús Patricio Martínez, because none of them seek political power. They are in search of the people from below to organize themselves.

It doesn’t matter who wins or doesn’t win the nomination, or the election, because rich and bad governments are very accustomed to cheating, to participate in fraud, and to buy votes in search of power.

If you like the actions and lies of the political parties, so be it. If you don’t want to vote, don’t vote. If you like the tricolor of the PRI, the blue of the PAN, the green of the Partido Verde, the yellow of the PRD, the brown of Morena, or whatever color you can imagine, so be it. But no matter what, we call on you to organize, because what is coming is worse than what you are suffering right now.”

I want to conclude with something that caught my attention during this intense week. Many of the ideas that indigenous women expressed in their speeches seemed to coincide with the words of other speakers, although the speakers generally did not have the opportunity to hear each other. Some of the words were not widely known, as many different languages were spoken. Most of them mentioned machismo, exclusion, and the suffering that the poor and women are subjected to. This is not surprising. However, at the heart of their concerns seemed to be the future of the planet and its sustainability, their hopes, and their determination to defend the planet and themselves. Because, as Marichuy said: “all indigenous peoples are one, with the Earth as our mother.”

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